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STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES AS
SOURCES OF RIGHTS FOR THE MENTALLY
DISABLED: THE LAST FRONTIER?*
Michael L. Perlin**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The evocation of a past, halcyon "golden age" is a popular and familiar concept, whether the subject matter is opera, rock 'n' roll, baseball
or television drama. Nostalgic images are warmly recalled of prima donnas who could really sing, of guitarists who could really rock, of sluggers
who could really hit and of dramatists who could really write. More
cynical commentators have suggested, though, that some of these images
are a bit distorted. Every generation, they suggest, has its own "golden
age" (roughly akin to those years of one's youth or adolescence when one
discovers the subject matter in question). Having grown up in the New
York metropolitan area in the early 1950's, I am still convinced that that
was the golden age of baseball (1951 [Willie Mays and Mickey Mantle
arrive] to 1957 [the Giants and Dodgers depart for the West Coast], for
purists), but I suppose I am willing-in the abstract, at least-to concede
the commentators' point.
On the other hand, if we look at the years 1972 to 1978 (which, not
so coincidentally, cover my youthful years as a litigator), we may agree
that these were, from the perspective of attorneys advocating on behalf of
the mentally disabled, the "golden age" of federal litigation. Consider
briefly the developments in the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts,
and Congress during those years.
First, and perhaps most importantly, institutionally, the federal
courts were undergoing significant change. The "hands off" doctrine 1* Copyright by Michael L. Perlin, 1986.
** Associate Professor of Law, and Director, Federal Litigation Clinic, New York Law

School. A.B. 1966, Rutgers University; J.D. 1969, Columbia University Law School.
The author wishes to thank Peter Margulies for his helpful comments and suggestions,
Joanne Kaminski and Karen Binder for their excellent research work on state constitutional

law issues and state statutory law issues, respectively, Chris Schaefer for her invaluable over-all
research assistance and Isabel Johnston for her first-rate administrative assistance.
1. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859

(1954); Siegel v. Ragan, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950). See generally Robbins & Buser,
Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and FederalCourt

Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. Rnv.
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which had, to a great extent, precluded relief in virtually all types of
institutional reform cases-was being slowly abandoned. 2 Simultaneously, the scope of the due process and equal protection clauses was being expanded in cases brought on behalf of a wide variety of minority
groups 3 and others, 4 many of whom could broadly be characterized as

coming within the protective confines of footnote 4 of United States v.
Carolene Products Co.5 Also, the scope of relief available under 42
U.S.C. section 19836 expanded exponentially following the Supreme
Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape.7 Further, a phenomenon becoming

known as "public interest law" 8 was taking root, through which it ap893, 898-99 (1977); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaintsof Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). The early history of prison lawand the initial successful attacks on this doctrine-is traced skillfully in Alexander, The New
PrisonAdministratorsand the Court. New Directionsin PrisonLaw, 56 TEx. L. REV. 963, 96465 (1978).
The argument that adequacy of treatment in a mental institution was a "nonjusticiable"
question was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975): "That argument is unpersuasive. Where 'treatment' is the sole asserted ground for
depriving a person of liberty, it isplainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless
to determine whether the asserted ground is present." Id. at 574 n.10 (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (there is "no curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country"); see also Robbins & Buser, supra
note 1, at 930 (federal intervention is a "last, but viable, resort" in prison conditions cases as a
means of "charting the perimeters of a maturing society").
3. The paradigmatic case is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977) (prison inmates), aff'd, 437
U.S. 678 (1978), rehg denied,439 U.S. 1122 (1979); Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir.
1975) (pretrial detainees); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (students
in need of special education services); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (retarded children).
For an excellent analysis of the characteristics which the mentally ill share with other
minority groups (e.g., juveniles, women and ethnic minorities), see Fleming, Shrinks vs. Shysters: The (Latest)Battlefor the Controlof the Mentally 11l, 6 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 355, 356
(1982) (lack of social power; controlled by an identifiable sociopolitical group; subject to control based upon a "[benign] stated motivation [justified by] the helplessness of the controlled
group").
5. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985); Lusky, Footnote Redux: A
Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
7. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). The Court's construction of § 1983 in Monroe-that plaintiffs may sue state officials directly to redress constitutional violations even where state law
provides a remedy-transformed the statute into "a major vehicle for general litigation in the
federal courts." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 n.13 (1981); see also Eckhardt & Eckhardt, 42 U.SC. § 1983: A Primerfor the Civil Rights Lawyer, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 585, 586
(1984) (Monroe enabled § 1983 to become "the primary remedy for redressing deprivations of
federal constitutional rights").
8. The seminal article is Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HAV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). See generally M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREr
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peared inevitable that classically "hidden" and disenfranchised groups
such as the mentally disabled9 would replicate the experiences of other
similarly-situated groups, turning to the apparently friendly confines of
the federal courts in an effort to seek vindication of fundamental consti-

tutional and civil rights. 10
In a wide variety of cases brought on behalf of the mentally ill and
the mentally retarded, federal district courts and courts of appeals thus
began to apply due process principles to such questions as substantive
limitations on the civil commitment power,1 1 the applicability of the
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine to both commitment and treatment matters,"2 the right of involuntarily confined individuals to treatADVOCACY (1974); Harrison & Jaffe, PublicInterest Law Firms: New Voicesfor New Constituencies, 58 A.B.A. J. 459 (1972); McKay, CivilLitigation and the PublicInterest, 31 U. KAN. L.
REv. 355 (1983); Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives in Public Interest Law, 28
STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976).

9. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3266 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mentally retarded have been subject
to "'lengthy and tragic' history of segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque"). The majority's ruling in Cleburne-applying rational basis scrutiny to legislative
classification affecting the mentally retarded-is analyzed critically in The Supreme Court,
1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 161-67 (1985); Comment, City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.: The Mentally Retarded and the Demise of
Intermediate Scrutiny, 20 VAL. U.L. Rv. 349 (1986); Margulies, The Newest Equal Protection: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center and Discrimination Against Group Homes
for the Mentally Disabled (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (to be published in 3 N.Y.L. SCH.
HUM. RTS. ANN.).

10. See Perlin, Rights of Ex-Patientsin the Community: The Next Frontier?,8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 33 (1980).

[Recent] development[s] of mental health rights law must be seen as a logical
culmination of the expansion of such parallel fields as civil rights, consumer rights,
criminal procedure, and inmates' rights: to a large extent, mental health law is at the
crossroads of all of those paths, as an outgrowth of a process by which lawyers have
become able to contribute to "public consciousness of inequities or shortcomings in
the society" through "substantive concerns with issues of social policy."
Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 41 nn.30A-30C. See generallyFletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution:InstitutionalRemedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982);
Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1982). But see Nagel, On Complaining
About the Burger Court (Book Review), 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2068, 2081 (1984) (The Warren
Court has been glorified and enshrined "because of a need for heroes," and "because of a need
for deeper roots in a political community-for ties and loyalties that could reduce the need for
moral simplicity in public affairs.").
11. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), reinstated,413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
12. See, e.g., Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded,
457 U.S. 307 (1982), on remand, 687 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1982); Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982), on remand, 691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir.
1982); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965);
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ment,"3 their right to refuse the imposition of certain medical
treatments, 14 their right to practice civil rights while institutionalized"65
and even the right to deinstitutionalization or community treatment.1
The United States Supreme Court appeared to be signalling that it

was comfortable with this trend. In his 1972 opinion for the Court in
Jackson v. Indiana, 7 Justice Blackmun applied the due process clause to
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 573,
on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975),
on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
13. See, e.g., Welsch v. Litkins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (later opinion), 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (later opinion), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (later proceeding), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
Judge Frank Johnson, the trial judge in Wyatt, has written extensively about his concept
of the general role of the federal judiciary in public interest litigation. See, e.g., Johnson, In
Defense of JudicialActivism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979); Johnson, The Legal Profession and
Social Change, 28 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1976); Johnson, The Role of the FederalCourts in Institu.
tionalLitigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981). Judge Johnson has been praised as a "phenomenon who ... has almost single-handedly, as a tour deforce, transfigured institutional care of
the mentally ill." Heller, Extension of Wyatt to Ohio Forensic Patients, in WYATr V.
STicK.NEY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 161, 172 (L. Ralph Jones & R. Parlour eds. 1981).
On the role of the judge in such litigation, see generally Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker: SuperintendingStructuralChange in PublicInstitutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43 (1979). In
Dent v. Duncan, Judge Rives wrote:
I look forward to the day when the State and its political subdivisions will again
take up their mantle of responsibility... and thereby relieve the federal Government
of the necessity of intervening in their affairs. Until that day arrives, the responsibility for this intervention must rest with those who through their ineptitude and public
disservice have forced it.
360 F.2d 333, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1966) (Rives, J., concurring specially).
On the question of implementing judicial decrees in such cases, see Special Project, The
Remedial Process in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1978); Note,
Implementation Problems in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977).
On the financial implications of such decrees, see Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the
Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980); Frug, The Judicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650
(Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on
remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F.
Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (supplemental opinion), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
15. See, eg., Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
16. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1978), modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), reinstated, 673 F.2d 647
(3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
There have been 28 published opinions on various aspects of the Pennhurst case. For a
complete list, see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1222
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
17. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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the nature and duration of civil commitment and offered this now-famous "cue bid" to aspiring litigants representing mentally disabled individuals: "Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps
remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations 18on [the com-

mitment] power have not been more frequently litigated."

Three years later, in O'Connorv. Donaldson,19 the Court, per Justice

Stewart, recognized that certain nondangerous, mentally ill individuals
have a "right to liberty" and added:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in custodial confinement. Assuming that the term can be
given a reasonably precise content and that the "mentally ill"
can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no con-

stitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they
are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.2 0
It is no wonder that within days after the O'Connor decision was published, advocates for patients 2 ' and prominent psychiatrists 22 were predicting that thousands of long-term patients would be deinstitutionalized

as a result of that opinion.

3

18. Id. at 737.
19. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
20. Id. at 575.
21. See, e.g., Grant, Donaldson, Dangerousness,and the Right to Treatment, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 599, 608 n.45 (1976) (citing N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 36, col. 3 (quoting
Bruce Ennis, Kenneth Donaldson's counsel before the Supreme Court)).
22. See, e.g., Choper, Consequences ofSupreme CourtDecisions Upholding IndividualConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 143-44 (1984) (quoting a July 8, 1975, television interview with Dr. Alan Stone, Chairman for Judicial Action of the American Psychiatric
Association); id. at 144 n.1044 (citing Opening the Asylums, TIME, July 7, 1975, at 44, regarding an estimate by American Psychiatric Association officials that 90% of compulsorily detained mental patients were not sufficiently dangerous to themselves or others to require
hospitalization in light of the O'Connor standard).
23. These predictions initially appeared excessive. See, e.g., Comment, O'Connor v. Donaldson: The Death of the Quid Pro Quo Argumentfor a Right to Treatment?,24 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 557, 571 (1975). A decade of experience has revealed, however, that to some extent the
expected deinstitutionalization has occurred. In Virginia, for example, where the state's statutory scheme was rewritten "in partial anticipation" of O'Connor,the state institutional population was reduced from 17,000 to 10,000 within five years of the new law's enactment.
Allerton, An AdministratorResponds, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD. REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DisABLED 17, 18 (1976).
On the multiple causes of deinstitutionalization, see generally Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, 238 ScI. AM. 46 (1978); Ewing, Health Planning
and Deinstitutionalization:Advocacy Within the Administrative Process, 31 STAN. L. REv. 679
(1979); Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595
(1983); Mills & Cummins, DeinstitutionalizationRevisited, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 271
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Finally, Congress also appeared to recognize the plight of the disabled by enacting the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of

Rights Act (DD),24 the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)25 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26 Congress stated that
"[p]ersons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate

treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilites ' 27 and that treatment "should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the

person's personal liberty."' 28 Congress prohibited discrimination against
the handicapped in any program or activity receiving federal aid 29 in order "to assure that all handicapped children have available to them.., a
free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs ....
Speaking on the Senate floor in support of the DD bill, Senator Javits, one of its chief sponsors, spoke eloquently and persuasively on be-

half of a far-reaching act, using language that appeared to reflect
Congress' intent in enacting the law: "Congress should reaffirm its belief
in equal rights for all citizens-including the developmentally disabled.
Congress should provide the leadership to change the tragic warehousing

of human beings that has been the product of insensitive Federal support
of facilities providing inhumane care and treatment of the mentally
1
retarded.

3

(1982); Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty' Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness, and Libertarian
Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1982); Williams, DeinstitutionalizationandSocial Policy.- Historical Perspectives and PresentDilemmas, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 54 (1980).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (Supp. III 1985).
25. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6009(1) (Supp. III 1985).
28. Id. § 6009(2).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual
.. shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency." Id.
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982).
31. 121 CONG. REC. 16,519 (1975). Quoting Thomas Wolfe, the late Senator Humphrey
once said:
"To every man his chance; to every man, regardless of his birth, his shining, golden
opportunity-to every man the right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become
whatever thing his manhood and his vision can combine to make him-this, seeker,
is the promise of America."
Cook, The Provision ofHealth and RehabilitationServices to DisabledPersons Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 693 (1979) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 525
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
Speaking in support of § 504, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph
Califano was no less eloquent: "For decades, handicapped Americans have been oppressed
and, all too often, a hidden minority, subjected to unconscionable discrimination, beset by
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In short, it appeared that this was truly the beginning of a "golden
age," and that mental disability advocates would continue to focus-virtually32 to the exclusion of state courts 3 3 -on the federal court as a preferred forum for litigation. Subsequent developments, however, revealed
that early responses to what was perceived as the Supreme Court's encouragement of this sort of litigation were, to be conservative, somewhat
exaggerated. Consider these occurrences in the past eight years.
demoralizing indignities, detoured out of the mainstream of American life and unable to secure
their rightful role as full and independent citizens.'" DuBow, CombattingHandicapDiscrimination with Title V of the RehabilitationAct of 1973: Employment and OtherRights, in LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1431, 1433 (1979) (quoting statement by Secre-

tary Califano of Apr. 27, 1977); see also id. at 1438-39 (discussing regulatory history of § 504).
Similarly, the Senate Report which accompanied the Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA) articulated a clear statement of purpose:
This Nation has long embraced a philosophy that the right to a free appropriate
public education is basic to equal opportunity and is vital to secure the future and the
prosperity of our people. It is contradictory to that philosophy when that right is not
assured equally to all groups of people within the Nation. Certainly the failure to
provide a right to education to handicapped children cannot be allowed to continue.
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1425, 1433.
Early analyses of § 504 and the EHA were unabashedly optimistic, an optimism that grew
more cautious as time passed. See, e.g., Cook, Nondiscrimination in Employment Under the
RehabilitationAct of 1973, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 31, 75 (1977) (section 504 is "a potential vehicle
for integrating disabled persons into the nation's work force"); Mayerson & Gill, After Davis-Are The Civil Rights OfDisabledPeopleIn Jeopardy?,15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 579, 581
(1981) ("Disability rights advocates must [now] proceed with great caution in litigating [§ ]
504 cases"); Wolff, Protectingthe DisabledMinority: Rights and Remedies UnderSections 503
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 25, 68 (1978) (significance of
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is "obvious" and impact "is expected to be extensive"); Note, EnforcingSection 504 Regulations: The Needfor a Private CauseofAction to Remedy Discrimination Against the Handicapped,27 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 345, 346 (1978) (section 504's potential has
"hardly been realized"); Note, The EducationForAll HandicappedChildrenAct: Opening The
Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 63 (1976) (EHA has "good prospect
of success"); Comment, § 504 and the HEWRegulations: Effectuatingthe Rights of the Handicapped, 5 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 107, 132 (1978) (after regulations promulgated, "§ 504 at last
has the vitality it has lacked for so long"); see also infra note 93.
32. Mental disability advocates, however, have not completely excluded seeking relief from
state courts. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975) (extending procedural
due process rights to insanity acquittees, and subsequently defining "dangerousness" for involuntary civil commitment purposes).
33. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124 (1977) ("Even if
state and federal forums were of equal technical competence, a series of psychological and
attitudinal characteristics renders federal district judges more likely to enforce constitutional
rights vigorously."). Neuborne also noted:
Federal district judges, appointed for life and removable only by impeachment,
are as insulated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally possible, precisely to
ensure their ability to enforce the Constitution without fear of reprisal. State trial
judges, on the other hand, generally are elected for a fixed term, rendering them
vulnerable to majoritarian pressure when deciding constitutional cases.
Id. at 1127-28.
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First, the Supreme Court has made it clear in cases arising from a
variety of fact patterns that it is, at the least, unsympathetic, and at the
worst, overtly hostile, to both the abstract notion of "public interest law"
and to the use of the federal courts as vehicles for wide-ranging institu-

tional reform. Writing for the majority in Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,34 Justice
Rehnquist left no doubts as to his views on this issue: "[Respondents']

claim that the Government has violated the Establishment Clause does
not provide a special license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court. The fed-

eral courts were simply not constituted as ombudsmen of the general
35
welfare."

On institutional reform in particular, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that courts could assume that state legislatures and institutional officials "are insensitive to the requirements of the
Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to
achieve the goals of [an institutional] system." 3 6

Most importantly, through a series of opinions beginning-not coincidentally for these purposes-with PennhurstState School & Hospital v.
34. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
35. Id. at 487 (footnote omitted). In United States v. Richardson, Justice Powell wrote:
"[W]e risk a progressive impairment of the effectiveness of the federal courts if their limited
resources are diverted increasingly from their historic role to the resolution of public-interest
suits brought by litigants who cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens."
418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
36. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547 (1979) ("Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."); id. at 548 ("the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial"). But see, Nagel, A Comment on the Burger
Court and "JudicialActivism," 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 223, 226 (1981) (discussing response to
Bell of the district court in Valentine v. Engelhardt, 474 F. Supp. 294, 301 (D.N.J. 1979)).
Throughout the early 1970's, many federal courts deciding penal and mental disability
cases-as well as a wide variety of cases arising in other factual settings-used special masters
and other alternative enforcement mechanisms to implement broad and far-reaching equitable
decrees. Nathan, The Use of Masters in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REV.
419, 421-23 (1979); Reynolds, The Mechanics of InstitutionalReform Litigation, 8 FORDHAM
URB. L. J.695 (1979-1980); Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special
Masters in FederalInstitutionalReform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 753, 754-55 nn.4 & 6 (1984); Special Project, supra note 13, at 431. See generally
FED. R. CIV. P. 53. These methods were especially appealing in cases posing "polycentric
problem[sJ that cannot easily be resolved through a traditional courtroom-bound adjudicative
process" and involved a "multitude of choices affecting [social] resources." Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). To some extent, no doubt, this
reflected the Supreme Court's attitude when it dealt with school desegregation cases, i.e., the
"imaginative expansion of federal equity powers to deal with deprivations of constitutional
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Halderman (Pennhurst//),37 the Court has expanded the scope of the
eleventh amendment.3 ' This move has drastically curtailed federal suits

against state officials in cases seeking relief under either pendent state
jurisdiction 9 or federal statutes. 4°
rights." Robbins & Buser, supra note 1, at 897 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971)).
For a sample of pertinent cases, see Brakel, Special Masters in InstitutionalLitigation,
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 544 n.4 (1979); Levine, supra, 760-61 nn.22-24. For a survey of
the literature analyzing the use of masters in such cases, see Brakel, supra, at 546 n.14; Levine,
supra, at 759 n.20. For a description of the elaborate review panel established to monitor
compliance with the court's order in the Willowbrook case, see New York Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27, 32-34 (2d Cir. 1979). For a functional analysis of how monitoring decrees work, see McCormack & Mandel, How to Manage an InstitutionDuring Litigation, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 73 (1985). For excellent overviews of the
historical authority for appointment of masters in institutional cases, see Hart,383 F. Supp. at
764-66; Levine, supra.
The Supreme Court has in recent years expressed clear hostility to this sort of institutional
reform effort. See, e.g., Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, and Rogers: The Burger Court andMental
Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 348 (1983) (recent Supreme Court decisions reflect a "clear signal" that the Court does not want the federal courts overseeing the
operation of facilities for the mentally disabled).
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorariin Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), on the question of whether a district court abused its discretion
in the appointment of two masters to supervise state officials in their implementation of state
law in a mental disability institutional reform case, it did not reach that issue in its opinion.
Id. at 96-97; see, e.g., Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1983),
reh'g denied, 718 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied sub nom. DiBuono v. Fauver, 465 U.S.
1102 (1984).
37. 465 U.S. 89; see also Green v. Mansour, 106 S.Ct. 423 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (1985).
38. Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 97-100; see, ag., Schwartz, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Law Claims, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 151 (1984); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61 (1984). Pertinent scholarship is
collected in Note, The Eleventh Amendment's Lengthening Shadow over FederalSubject Matter
Jurisdiction:Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 34 DE PAUL L. Rnv. 515, 515
n.1 (1985).
39. Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 117-21; see also id. at 121 ("neither pendent jurisdiction nor any
other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment").
The Pennhurstfacility has been described within the past 15 years as a "Dachau, without
ovens." Note, The "Right" to Habilitation: Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman
and Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 CONN. L. Rav. 557 (1982) (quoting L. LIPPMAN & I.
GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION 17 (1973)).
40. Atascadero, 105 S.Ct. at 3147 ("Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally
secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute," rejecting claim against state official premised on § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985)). See generally Brown, State Sovereignty
Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth:
Some BroaderImplicationsof Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEo. L.J. 363 (1985);
Lehrer, Expanding the States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity (Again): A Comment on Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon and Green v. Mansour, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 3 (1986).
For an analysis of Atascadero from an eleventh amendment perspective prior to the Supreme
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I personally agree with the views expressed on this matter by Professors Rudenstine,4 Sherry 42 and Chemerinsky4a: (1) the Pennhurst II
majority wants to limit lower federal court power to reform state and4

local institutions on the basis of allegedfederal law violations as well;
(2) court reform of penal and mental institutions will be countenanced
only in "extreme circumstances";" (3) the Justices' opposition to judicially-ordered social reform stems from a hostility to the litigants' underlying substantive claims; 46 (4) the current Supreme Court is "deeply

committed to protecting the states from intrusion by the federal judiciary";47 (5) the Court's true agenda is to transform its role from the
48

guardian of individual rights to that of "guardian of majority rule";
and, ultimately, (6) Pennhurst11 threatens to "undermine the ability of
the federal courts to remedy state and local government violations of the
United States Constitution. ' 49 Whether or not these scholars are correct
is not crucial; the significance of the PenhurstII line of cases lies in the

undeniable fact that, at least until there is a significant restructuring of
the Supreme Court,

°

the terrain of federal courts will prove to be far

more hostile to suits brought on behalf of the mentally disabled than it
Court's decision, see Note, The Eleventh Amendment and State Damage Liability Under the
RehabilitationAct of 1973, 71 VA. L. REv. 655 (1985).
41. Rudenstine, JudiciallyOrderedSocialReform: Neofederalism andNeonationalismand
the Debate Over PoliticalStructure, 59 S.CAL. L. REv. 451 (1986) [hereinafter Rudenstine I];
Rudenstine, Pennhurst andthe Scope of FederalJudicialPowerto Reform Social Institutions,6
CARDOZO L. REV. 71 (1984) [hereinafter Rudenstine II].
42. Sherry, Issue Manipulationby the Burger Court: Saving the Community From Itself,
70 MINN. L. REv. 611 (1986).
43. Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and FederalCourt Power: The Eleventh Amendment
after Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 643 (1985).
44. Rudenstine II, supranote 41, at 83. His major source for this analysis, see id. at 83-84,
is footnote 13 of Pennhurst I, which reads:
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction under this
reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law, but we note that the
scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism.
"Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts
must be constantly mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved
between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law."'
Pennhurst I, 465 U.S. at 104 n.13 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951))) (emphasis added).
45. Rudenstine II, supra note 41, at 109.
46. Rudenstine I, supra note 41, at 482. Professor Rudenstine sees this, however, as an
"incomplete theory... because it accounts only for what Justices' [ do not value, and leaves
undefined the values they prize." Id. at 483.
47. Sherry, supra note 42, at 631.
48. Id. at 663.
49. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 645.
50. The Court has, of course, shown a willingness to reverse itself fairly rapidly in other
areas of constitutional law. For example, the Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, reh'gdenied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985), recently overruled National League of
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was a decade ago.51
Second, on mental disability issues, the Supreme Court has expressed what can charitably be referred to as mixed signals. On commitment issues, while the Court mandated certain due process rights in cases
involving prison-hospital transfers52 and "split the difference" on the
question of the appropriate burden of proof,5 3 it rejected the argument
that broad procedural due process protections apply to such diverse
"special" populations as juveniles, 54 insanity acquittees 5 and sex offenders. 56 In French v. Blackburn57 the Court also summarily affirmed5 8 a

district court decison which approved a set of commitment procedures
that provided patients with significantly fewer due process protections

than were countenanced by earlier cases following the rationale first articulated in 1972 in Lessard v. Schmidt.5 9 In French, questions concerning the need for a compulsory probable cause hearing, 60 appropriate
notice6 1 and a jury trial, 62 as well as questions regarding the patient's
presence at a commitment hearing6 3 such as the applicability of the priviCities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), substituting a more limited federalism inquiry where
Congress acts pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce.
51. See generally Neuborne, supra note 33.
52. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (right to notice, hearing, confrontation, crossexamination, an independent decisionmaker, statement of reasons and "qualified and in-

dependent assistance"); see also id. at 497-500 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
54. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
55. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
56. Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
57. 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 901 (1977).
58. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a summary affirmance, while serving as a
ruling on the merits, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975), has "considerably less
precedential value than an opinion on the merits." Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1979); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974). Summary action on a case "represents no more than a view that the judgment appealed from was correct as to those federal questions raised and necessary to the decision. It
does not... necessarily reflect our agreement with the opinion of the court whose judgment is
appealed." Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 474 (1979); see also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) ("the rationale of
the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the opinion below"). This line of authority is
generally traced to Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See generally Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Court for
Want of a SubstantialFederalQuestion: Some Implicationsof Hicks v. Miranda, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 508 (1976).
59. See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. 1078.
60. French, 428 F. Supp. at 1355-56.
61. Id. at 1356-57.
62. Id. at 1360-62.
63. Id. at 1357-58.
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lege against self-incrimination in commitment matters" and the appropriate burden of proof were resolved against the disabled. 5

On substantive constitutional issues, the Court announced a right to

"minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom

from undue restraint" for the mentally disabled 66 and "assumed" that
involuntarily confined patients retained some constitutionally-protected

liberty interests which are "implicated by the involuntary administration
of antipsychotic drugs." 67 The Court, however, also clearly indicated
that it would give extraordinary deference to the exercise of professional
judgment in institutional cases, 68 especially where damages were

sought.69 As the Court stated explicitly in Youngberg v. Romeo: "By so
limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions,
interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operation of the
institutions should be minimized."7 °
While reading the tea leaves of "vacate and remand in the light of"
opinions can be foolhardy,7" the Court's decision to remand Rennie v.
73
Klein7 2 in light of Youngberg rather than in light of Mills v. Rogers

cannot be brushed off as unimportant. This decision reflected a clear
statement on the Court's part that the Youngberg test should govern virtually all substantive institutional cases. 74

On the issue of the role of expert testimony in cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants, 75 the Court has remained overwhelm64. Id. at 1358-59.
65. Id. at 1359-60.
66. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
67. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982).
68. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322; see also Alexander, supra note 1, at 963 (recent Supreme
Court decisions "display a tolerance for and even a deference to the new prison administrators'
values").
69. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 (in damages action against professional in his individual
capacity, professional will not be liable if unable to satisfy normal professional standards because of "budgetary constraints").
70. Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
71. See Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, andRemanded"--SheddingLight on a Dark Corner
of Supreme Court Practice,67 JUDICATURE 389, 390 (1984) (such decisions employ the "most
puzzling mode of disposition in the Supreme Court's repertory").
72. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). See generally Perlin, Can Mental Health Professionals Predict
Judicial Decisionmaking? Constitutional and Tort Liability Aspects of the Right of the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled to Refuse Treatment: At the Cutting Edge (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (to be published in 3 ToURo L. Rnv.).
73. 457 U.S. 291.
74. For a survey of cases, see Perlin, Patients'Rights, in 3 PSYCHIATRY 4, 18 nn.61-64
(1986).
75. Matters affecting mentally disabled criminal defendants are generally beyond the scope
of this paper. See generally Perlin, The Supreme Court, The Mentally DisabledCriminalDefendant, Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling
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ingly ambivalent, and seemingly, irreconcilably inconsistent.7 6 At the
penalty phase of a capital punishment case, the Court, in Barefoot v. Estelle,7 7 allowed into evidence responses to hypotheticals on the future
78
danger of defendant by experts who never examined the defendant.
The Court blithely79 assured us that jurors can separate the "wheat from
the chaff" 0 in such testimony. 1 Yet, the Court also held in Ake v.
Oklahoma 82 that an indigent defendant facing the death penalty has a
right to expert psychiatric assistance where he makes an "ex parte
threshold showing... that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in

his defense,"' 83 in light of "the [extremely high] risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues." 84
Although there has been a profound split in the lower federal courts'
interpretations of each of these signals by the Supreme Court,85 the fact
is inescapable that the Court has not-either covertly or overtly-en-

couraged expansive decisionmaking in institutional cases brought on behalf of the mentally disabled.8 6

Similarly, in construing federal statutes, the Court has given mostly
crabbed readings of the laws in question.

Justice Rehnquist, in

the Ake in Barefoot'sAchilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 91 (1985). In addition to
cases discussed infra at text accompanying notes 76-84, see also Smith v. Murray, 106 S.Ct.
2661 (1986); Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.Ct.
634 (1986); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
76. See Perlin, supra note 75, at 164-69.
77. 463 U.S. 880, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).
78. Id. at 902-05.
79. See id. at 916, 928-30 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id. at 901 n.7.
81. But see id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In a capital case, the specious testimony
of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability
of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself.").
82. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
83. Id. at 82-83.
84. Id. at 82.
85. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 74, at 4-5, 8, 18-19 nn.54-82E, 19-20 nn.126-44; Perlin,
supra note 75. For particularly expansive readings, see Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 459 (1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 1992 and 107 S.Ct. 235 (1986). For a narrow interpretation, see Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983). One opinion in Clark characterized Phillips' interpretation
of Youngberg as "simply incorrect." Clark, 794 F.2d at 87, 97 n.12 (Becker, J., concurring).
On the important issue of applying PennhurstII to previously entered institutional consent decrees, see Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (community placement of the mentally retarded); De Gidio v. Perpich, 612 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Minn. 1985), rev'd,
807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987) (prison medical care).
86. For a recent non-institutional case, see United States Dep't of Treasury v. Galioto, 106
S. Ct. 2683 (1986) (equal protection challenge to blanket statutory ban on purchase of firearms
by former mental patients).
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Pennhurst1,87 brushed aside the Third Circuit's careful analysis of the

DD Act and rejected plaintiffs' arguments that broad relief could be
structured under that law. The Court found that the legislation was little
more than a federal-state grant funding mechanism88 and that nothing in
the Act suggested that Congress had intended to require the states to
"assume the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least
restrictive environment' to their mentally retarded citizens." 89 Academic

commentary on this decision was almost entirely critical, reading the
opinion as "eschew[ing]... logic," 90 "distort[ing] the major issue" ina

"contorted framing" of the case, 9 1 and as reflecting a "general hostility
toward law reform efforts on the merits." 92
While the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act and the Education of the Handicapped Act have been
somewhat conflicting,9 3 it is also clear that these laws will not be con87. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Ferleger & Scott, Rights and Dignity: Congress, the Supreme Court, andPeople With
DisabilitiesAfter Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 327, 356 (1983). Ferleger was lead
counsel for plaintiffs in the Pennhurst case.
91. Id. at 352.
92. Brant, supra note 36, at 342.
The Court has clearly stated that notions of federalism limit federal court interference in state activity, and require the judiciary to leave major policy decisions to
other executive officials. The Court's policy of deference manifests itself not only in
its substantive unwillingness to approve sweeping orders for institutional reform, but
in its use of procedural devices to make the bringing of law reform cases more
difficult.
Id. at 331-32 (footnotes omitted).
93. For recent analyses of relevant § 504 cases, see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
(1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); see also Richards, HandicapDiscriminationin Employment: The RehabilitationAct of 1973, 39 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1985); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under
Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1984); Note, The Price
of Discrimination: ProposedEntitlement to CompensatoryRelief UnderSection 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 47 ALB. L. REv. 1307 (1983); Note, The DiscriminationStatutes and
the Supreme Court's 'Program'forConfusion, 17 CONN. L. REv. 629 (1985); Note, Safeguarding Equalityfor the Handicapped: CompensatoryRelief underSection 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 1986 DUKE L.J. 197.
The Supreme Court's most recent § 504 decisions, United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 106 S.Ct. 2705 (1986), and Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S.Ct.
2101 (1986), have held, respectively, that § 504 did not apply to commercial airlines, rejecting a
challenge to certain Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulations which had exempted most
such airlines from their regulatory scope, and that a hospital's decision to withhold treatment
from severely handicapped newborns did not violate § 504. The Supreme Court recently decided that a school teacher afflicted with tuberculosis comes within the protective scope of
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strued as broadly as its proponents had hoped.94
As a result of these developments, the notion of wide-ranging insti-

tutional and procedural reform in federal court cases involving the mentally disabled no longer appeared to be "an idea in good currency." It
appeared that the "pendulum" had shifted9' and that, in cases where the
§ 504. See School Bd. v. Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987), affirming 772 F.2d
759 (11th Cir. 1985).
In Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-04 (1982), the Court established a
basic "floor of opportunity" by construing the EHA to set as its goals equal access, rather than
equal opportunity for handicapped children. Id. at 201. The access need only be "sufficient to
confer some educational benefit -upon the handicapped child." Id. at 200. Critical response to
Rowley has been nearly uniformly hostile. See, eg., Note, Board of Education v. Rowley:
LandmarkRoadblock or Another Signpost on the Road to State Courts, 16 CONN.L. REv. 149
(1983) [hereinafter Landmark]; Note, Crippling the Education of all Handicapped Children
Act: Board of Education v. Rowley, 12 STETSON L. REv. 791 (1983); Comment, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act Since 1975, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 51, 70-75 (1985).
In Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), the Court held that
clean intermittent catheterization is a "related service" required by the EHA. Id. at 887-95;
see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982). The provision of the EHA requiring services limited to
those that "may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education" is
discussed in Comment, supra, at 76. The author there stated: "Once again, the Court set forth
a legally sound, theoretical standard, but failed to devise concrete, substantive guidelines to aid
special educators in determining when a service does, in fact, benefit a child's education." Id.
Another commentator has noted that "[u]nfortunately, the guarantees of [the EHA] are not
yet functionally clear." Note, School Health Services for Handicapped Children: The Door
Opens No Further, 64 NEB. L. REv. 509, 536 (1985); see also Burlington School Comm. v.
Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (reimbursement for private education expenses);
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (interplay between EHA and § 504 on question of
availability of attorneys' fees); Goodwin, Public School Integrationof Children With Handicaps
After Smith v. Robinson: "Separate But Equal" Revisited?, 37 ME.L. REv. 267, 299 (1985)
("One may ask whether Smith is the harbinger of legally sanctioned 'separate but equal'
schools for the handicapped."). For a recent survey of all cases, see Zucker, Rights of the
Handicapped: Education, ANN. SuRv. OF AM. L. 575 (1984).
Among the most difficult questions still unresolved under both § 504 and the EHA are
their applicability to persons with AIDS. See, e.g., Jones, The Educationfor All Handicapped
Children Act: Coverage of Children with Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome, 15 J.L. &
EDuc. 195 (1986).
94. One of § 504's co-sponsors, Senator Harrison Williams, had articulated its intent as
"plac[ing] special emphasis on the target populations whose needs were not being met, and to
grapple with problems, which while not related solely to rehabilitation, pose serious problems
for handicapped individuals in becoming employed, staying employed, and generally supporting themselves within their communities." 119 CONG. REc. 24,587-88 (1973); see also
DuBow, supra note 34, at 1438 ("Section 504 is considered by handicapped people as the
broadest protection of their rights").
For the pertinent history of the EHA, reflecting similar views of sponsors and aspirations
by advocates, see Comment, Beyond ConventionalEducation: A Definition of Education Under
the EducationForAllHandicapped ChildrenAct ofl975, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.63, 6771 (1985). See also Yohalem, The Right to Education, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS, at 1093, 1096
(1979) (right of handicapped children to special education now "firmly established" as result of
EHA).
95. The use of the "pendulum" metaphor has grown exponentially in recent months. See,
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Court was not overtly hostile, it merely chose to "sidestep" 96 difficult

decisions so as to avoid dealing with some of the issues raised by litigants.
Thus, it was inevitable that advocates on behalf of this population would

search for new bases for causes of action and new forums in which to
bring such cases.
Two of the most important developments in this area have been the
use of (1) state constitutions9 7 and (2) state statutes-commonly called
"Patients' Bills of Rights"---as the source of such rights. While com-

paratively little academic and scholarly attention has been paid to this
phenomenon (which is still sufficently diffused such that it cannot accurately be called a "movement"), its importance will grow immeasurably

in the next decade. Since it is not realistic to expect that the Rehnquist
Court will be any more favorably disposed to the idea of expanding the
rights of the institutionalized mentally disabled than the Burger Court, 99
eg., Durham and La Fond, The EmpiricalConsequences andPolicyImplicationsofBroadening
the Statutory Criteriafor Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 395, 398 (1985) ("the
pendulum of public attitudes and state policy is swinging again"); Myers, Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Mentally 111:
A System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 379
(1983-84) ("the pendulum may have swung too far"); Shuman, Innovative Statutory Approaches to Civil Commitment: An Overview and Critique, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE
284, 286 (1985) ('Now, it appears, the swing toward dangerousness as an all exclusive criterion for commitment of the mentally ill has reached the height of its arc and has begun to
reverse direction.").
96. See, eg., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1230 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Court "side-stepped" the issue of existence of private right of action under § 504 in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404-05 n.5 (1979)); see also Wexler, Seclusion
and Restraint: Lessons from Law, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
285, 290 (1982) (Court "skirted" question of right to refuse treatment in Mills); Note,
O'Connor v. Donaldson: The Supreme Court Sidesteps the Right to Treatment, 13 CAL. W.L.
REv. 168 (1976); Comment, supra note 23, at 564-65 (Court "sidestepped" constitutional right
to treatment arguments in O'Connor). But see Darrone,465 U.S. at 690 n.7 (existence of private cause of action under § 504 conceded by defendants).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 100-319.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 320-601.
This Article will omit, due to time and space limitations, discussion on such state statutes
that parallel § 504 in barring employment discrimination. See, e.g., Note, From Wanderers to
Workers. A Survey of Federaland State Employment Rights of the Mentally Ill, 45 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (Summer 1982). This Article also does not discuss state statutes that
parallel the EHA in mandating special education services for handicapped children. See generally S. BRAKEL, J.PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 63048

(1985).
99. Chief Justice Burger's well-documented interest in mental disablility law has been
characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979) (establishing burden of "clear and convincing evidence" as standard of proof in involuntary civil commitment proceeding, rejecting both "preponderance" standard and "beyond a
reasonable doubt" quantum); see also Burger, Psychiatrists,Lawyers and the Courts, 28 FED.
PROBATION 3, 6 (June 1964); Delgado, "Concurrence" in Quotes: A CriticalAssessment of
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the use of state constitutions and state statutes in state courts may be the
last frontier for the mentally disabled.
Chief Justice Burger's Objections to a Right to Treatmentfor the Involuntarily Confined Mentally Ill, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 527 (1982); Perlin, supra note 75.
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinions in O'Connor and Youngberg underscore his
antipathy to the declaration of a substantive constitutional right to treatment. O'Connor, 422
U.S. at 578 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 329 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
His majority opinion in Parham has been criticized for ignoring "[tihe physical conditions,
isolation and dangers of day-to-day life in institutions." Ferleger, Special Problems in the
Commitment of Children, in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS, at 397, 404 (1979). Nonetheless, his O'Connor
concurrence also helped firmly establish the application of procedural due process standards to
the civil commitment process. See, e.g., In re S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 137, 462 A.2d 1252, 1256
(1983) (establishing placement review hearings for patients discharged pending placement);
Perlin, "DischargedPending Placement" The Due ProcessRights of the NondangerousInstitutionalized Mentally Handicapped With "Nowhere to Go," Directions in Psychiatry
(Watherleigh Co.) vol. 5, lesson 21 (1985). Because commitment "effects a great restraint on
individual liberty, this power of the State is constitutionally bounded." O'Connor, 422 U.S. at
580 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), established for the first time that admitting into evidenceat the penalty phase of a capital punishment trial-testimony of a "neutral" psychiatrist who
had examined a defendant to determine his competency to stand trial violated the fifth and
sixth amendments. Id. at 461-71. But see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (urging limitation on Court's decision to capital cases); see also supra text
accompanying notes 82-84.
His preoccupations-perhaps a reflection of his lengthy battles with Judge Bazelon when
they served on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals-also reflect his ambivalence about
the role of psychiatry in the mental health process. See Perlin,supra note 75, at 168 & n.502;
see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 (rejecting beyond a reasonable doubt standard, in part,
because "[g]iven the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a
serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous"); O'Connor,422 U.S. at 584 (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("There can be little responsible debate regarding 'the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' ") (quoting Greenwood v.
United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)). But see Delgado, supra, at 543-45 (as a result of
subsequent and more contemporaneous medical developments, the former Chief Justice's uncertainty-of-diagnosis argument has "lost much of its original force").
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist's record reflects only hostility to cases
brought on behalf of the mentally disabled, especially-but not exclusively-in the context of a
criminal trial. In Estelle, he concurred on the grounds that defendant's counsel should have
been notified of the psychiatric examination in question, adding that he was "not convinced"
that any fifth amendment rights were implicated. 451 U.S. at 474-75 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). He dissented in Ake, suggesting that: (1) the Court's rule should be limited to capital
cases, and (2) "the entitlement is to an independent psychiatric evaluation, not to a defense
consultant." 470 U.S. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Allen v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. 2988 (1986), held
that proceedings under Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were not "criminal," thus
making inapplicable the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, notwithstanding the fact that sex offenders were committed to maximum security institutions also housing
convicts in need of psychiatric care. And, as indicated above, his opinion for the Court in
PennhurstI held that certain bill of rights sections of the Developmentally Disordered Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act) did not create any substantive rights to "appropriate
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This paper will first examine the historical background of state constitutional developments (Part 11A), and will then review the various
methodologies employed in construing state constitutional provisions
(Part IIB). Next, it will examine the expanding role of state constitutions
as a specific source of rights for the mentally disabled (Part II).
It will then consider the traditional role of state statutes in governing treatment of the mentally disabled (Parts IIIA and B), examine
the significance of the Wyatt v. Stickney case and the report of the President's Commission on Mental Health in relation to subsequent statutory
developments (Parts IIC and D), and will finally consider the expanding
role of these statutes as a parallel source of rights of the same population
(Parts IIIE and F).

II.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS

A.

HistoricalBackground

Although the emergence of state constitutional law as a scholarly
topic worthy of serious scrutiny by judges," ° academics, 10 1 and practitreatment" in the "least restrictive" environment for mentally retarded individuals. Estelle,
451 U.S. at 29; see supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
In two cases, Chief Justice Burger joined separate opinions written by Justice Rehnquist.
In Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.Ct. 634 (1986), the majority ruled that the use of a criminal defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence, as evidence to prove his sanity,
violated due process. Id. at 638-41. Justice Rehnquist concurred, suggesting that a request for
a lawyer "may be highly relevant where the plea is based on insanity." Id. at 642 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring). In Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986), Justice Rehnquist dissented
squarely, arguing that the eighth amendment does not create a substantive right not to be
executed while insane. Id. at 2613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. See, eg., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill ofRights, 9
U. BALT. L. REV.379 (1980); Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative,
63 TEx. L. REV. 1081 (1985) [hereinafter Mosk I]; Mosk, Whither Thou Goest-The State
Constitution and Election Returns, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 753 (1985) [hereinafter Mosk II];
Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources ofFundamentalRights, 35 RUTGERS L.REV.
707 (1983) [hereinafter Pollock I]; Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a
Means of Balancingthe RelationshipBetween State and FederalCourts, 63 TEx. L. REV. 977
(1985) [hereinafter Pollock II]; Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court
Comment on Federal ConstitutionalIssues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1025 (1985); Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a
Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1984). Justice Brennan's article has been
called the Magna Carta of state constitutional law. Pollock I, supra, at 716.
101. See, e.g., Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: JudicialActivism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1982); Howard, State Courts
and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Welsh,
Whose Federalism?- The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10
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tioners 0 z is a relatively recent phenonemon, 10 3 California Supreme
Court Justice Stanley Mosk 1 4 has stressed that "[w]hen the Founding
Fathers put this one nation together, they
recognized the primacy of the
10 5
'
states in protecting individual rights."

Before 1776,106 various colonies of the New World guaranteed their

citizens freedom of religion, 10 7 freedom of the press,10 8 freedom of
L.Q. 819 (1983); Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional
Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1195 (1985) [hereinafter Williams I].
Not all commentators have been so favorable. See, eg., Maltz, The Dark Side of State
Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv. 995 (1985).
HASTINGS CONST.

102. See, ag., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (P. Bamberger

ed. 1985) [hereinafter RECENT DEVELOPMENTS].

103. Historians have traditionally studied the issues involved. See, e.g., F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES 1776-1860, 52-56 (1930). The

first major law review article on the topic, however, did not appear until 1951. See Paulsen,
State Constitutions,State Courtsand FirstAmendment Freedoms,4VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951).
--There was minimal academic interest in this topic in the 1960's. See, e.g., Force, State "Billsof
Rights": A Case of Negkabnd-the-Needfor a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REv. 125 (1969);
Graves, State ConstitutionalLaw: A Twenty-five Year Summary, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1966); see also Collins, supra note 101, at 4 n.11 (characterizing Paulsen's article as "far too
often overlooked," and Force's as "valuable but forgotten"). But it was not until the early
1970's, perhaps not coincidentally, the time of the emergence of the Burger Court, that academic scholarship began to flourish. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 101, at 874-79; Ludlow,
Recent Developments in the New Federalism, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at
405, 479-83 (listing articles); Linde, supra note 100, at 396 n.70 (same); Note, Developments in
the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1328-29
n.20 (1982).
For an early compilation of state constitutions, see W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS (1973); F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA (1909).

104. See Mosk I, supra note 100; Mosk II, supra note 100; see also Mosk, Contemporary
Federalism, 9 PAC. L.J. 711 (1978) [hereinafter Mosk III].
105. Mosk I, supra note 100, at 1082 (footnote omitted). Madison wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government,
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce.... The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the state.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 319 (J. Madison) (E.Bourne ed. 1947). See generally C. BLOCH,
STATES' RIGHTS: THE LAW OF THE LAND (1958).

106. In 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties prohibited double jeopardy. See MASS.
BODY OF LIBERTIES § 42 (1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 153 (R. Perry ed.
1978); see also 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971).
107. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), reprintedin
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 106, at 169, 170.
108. VA. CONST. § 12 (1776), reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 106, at

312.

1268

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:1249

speech, 109 and prohibited ex post facto laws110 and peacetime quartering
of soldiers. 1 For example, the North Carolina Declaration of Rights
adopted in 1776 included
a compendium of most of the fundamental rights which had

come to be recognized by American Constitution-makers: trial
by jury, right to accusation and confrontation, privilege against
self-incrimination, right against excessive bail or fines, cruel
and unusual punishment, and general warrants, that not to be
deprived of life, liberty, or property "but by the law of the
land," freedom of the press, right to bear arms,freedom of con-

science, and prohibition of ex post facto laws." 2
These provisions were an outgrowth of the colonists' pre-Revolutionary
War distrust of Parliament, 13 and served as "limitations imposed by the
sovereign people on all branches of government, including the legisla-

ture." ' 4 The "catalogue of civil liberties" '

in the pre-independence

documents reflected "the beginning of the
American constitutional doc116
trine of equality in fundamental law.
Significantly, during the months preceding American independence,

the idea of preparing uniform state constitutions was considered and rejected.

7

As a result, while many of the documents incorporated provi-

109. PA. CONST. art. XII (1776), reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 106,

at 330.
110. DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 11 (1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 106, at 339.
111. Id. § 21.
112. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 286.
113. Note, supra note 103, at 1326.
114. Id. at 1326 (emphasis added).
115. Linde, supra note 100, at 381.
116. Williams, Equality in State ConstitutionalLaw, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 102, at 71-72 (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Williams II]; see also Williams I, supra note
101, at 1195-1203. Professor Williams noted that:
As the colonies moved toward a revolutionary posture, equality became a key element of political rhetoric.
"Between 1763 and 1776 the political leadership in the colonies adopted the
postulate of equality as part of its active vocabulary because it provided the most
effective argument for justifying resistance to colonial rule."
Williams II, supra, at 72 (quoting John Adams); see also J.BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION 38-56 (1983); Howard, "For the Common Benefit": ConstitutionalHistory in
Virginia As A Casebookfor the Modern Constitution-Maker,54 VA. L. REV. 816, 823 (1968).
The broad equality provisions in the Virginia Bill of Rights are owed "to the teachings of
natural law, rather than to the dictates of the British Constitution." Howard, supra, at 823-24;
see also VA. CONST. § 1 (1776), reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 106, at
311.
117. Linde, supra note 100, at 381. See generally F. GREEN, supra note 103, at 52-56.
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sions such as those in the North Carolina enactment' 1 8 and Maryland's

Declaration of Rights,'1 9 the early state charters and constitutions were a
remarkably diverse group of documents120 through which the colonists

could "reject English political thought and.., elaborate a new principle
of political legitimacy."''
These state guarantees appeared so secure-and the powers of the
prospective federal government so confined--"that a federal bill of rights
was never seriously considered" at the 1787 Constitutional Conven-

tion.122 The federal Bill of Rights, 2 ' eventually added "to allay fears
that the new national government might use its power to curtail individual liberties,"' 24 was thought unnecessary as applied to the states "where
governments were trusted local authorities within the control of the
25

citizenry."'1

Thus, it was no surprise that the Supreme Court, in Barron v. Balti127
more, 126 held that the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.
118. See supra note 112.
119. See MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS arts. 19-20, 22-23, 38 (1776), reprintedin
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 106, at 346-51.

120. Pollock II, supra note 100, at 978; see also id. at 979 (lauding system's "vibrant diversity"). According to Justice Pollock, Justice Brandeis' famous version of the "single courageous State... as a laboratory [which can] try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country," New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), stems from this historical diversity. Pollock II, supra note 100, at
978 n.8; see also Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1985).
121. Note, supra note 103, at 1326.
122. Id. at 1327.
123. According to Professor Wood, James Madison introduced a federal bill of rights in the
first Congress "primarily to quiet opponents of the federal Constitution." G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 542 (1969). It has been argued that

the amendments eventually adopted in the Bill of Rights "represented a simplified list of state
rights and did not claim to provide any greater or lesser degree of protection." Note, supra
note 103, at 1327; see Brennan, supra note 100, at 501 ("Prior to the adoption of the federal
Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the federal bill of rights previously
had been protected in one or more state constitutions."). See generally Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 65 (E.Cahn ed. 1963).
124. Mosk I, supra note 100, at 1083 (emphasis added); see also Linde, supra note 100, at
381.
125. Mosk I, supra note 100, at 1083. See generally C. BLOCH, supra note 105. Interestingly, the states that promulgated new constitutions after the enactment of the federal bill of
rights often took their bills
of rights from preexisting state constitutions rather than from the

federal amendments. Linde, supra note 100, at 381; see also Swindler, State Constitutional
Law: Some RepresentativeDecisions, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 166, 173 (1967) ("Historically,
new states in the westward movement of the nation borrowed in whole or in part from the
constitutions of older states in preparing their first constitutions.").

126. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.).
127. Id. at 250-51.
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As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, the adoption of the fifth amendas a mode of doing
ment "could never have occurred to any human being
12 8

that which might be effected by the state itself.

From the time of Marbury v. Madison129 and other early decisions
upholding the power of the Supreme Court, 13 0 "there was a relentless

tide of authority flowing from the states to the federal government.''113

While the Bill of Rights was rarely litigated in the first half of the nine-

teenth century,132 ratification of the fourteenth amendment and the subsequent use of the incorporation doctrine to make selected Bill of Rights

guarantees apply to the states 133 "obscured the
functional independence
' 34
of the original state and federal guarantees."'
1 35
This movement reached its zenith during the Warren Court years

when, according to Professor Howard, it became "easy for state courts
...to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal consti-

tutional law." 136 As a result, and because of the states' "dismal record of
128. Id.; cf Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated first amendment rights as to the states); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (applying Gitlow as reflecting incorporation doctrine).
129. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). It should be noted, however, that two decades before
Marbury was decided, the Virginia Court of Appeals found that it had the power to declare a
state law unconstitutional and that at least three state courts-in New Hampshire, North Carolina and Rhode Island-did so prior to the drafting of the federal Constitution, See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. 5, 8 (1782); Howard, supra note 101, at 877 n.20.
130. See, eg., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
131. Mosk I, supra note 100, at 1084.
132. Note, supra note 103, at 1327.
On the other hand, Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John J.Gibbons has studied the
period between 1790 and 1860 to review the then common practice of relegating the litigation
of federal issues to state courts, and has concluded that this practice resulted in a "consistent
failure of implementation of federal governmental policy." Gibbons, Federal Law and the
State Courts: 1790-1860, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 399, 402 (1984). According to Judge Gibbons,
"[this] experience... teaches us that [dual sovereignty] will not work as a legal system unless
the national government undertakes to have its own courts in place.., providing prompt and
effective enforcement or relief under the national laws." Id. at 452.
133. For a survey of cases, see Countryman, WhyA State Bill ofRights?, 45 WASH. L. REv.
454, 456-66 (1970).
134. Note, supra note 103, at 1328.
135. According to Justice Brennan:
It was in the years from 1962 to 1969 that the face of the law changed. Those
years witnessed the extension to the states of nine of the specifics of the Bill of Rights;
decisions which have had a profound impact on American life, requiring the deep
involvement of state courts in the application of federal law.
Brennan, supra note 100, at 493. See Ludlow, supra note 103, at 410-11, for a list of pertinent
decisions.
136. Howard, supra note 101, at 878. According to Justice Brennan, "it was only natural
that when during the 1960's our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming increas-
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employing their state constitutions," 137 the question was raised by
respected commentators as to whether state bills of rights "still served a
13
worthwhile purpose." 1

Although the controversy rages as to whether or not the Burger
Court has been a "revolutionary" one in its approach to constitutional

litigation,13 9 there can be little disputing that the Supreme Court's last
decade has been "marked most profoundly by a retrenchment of individual rights, particularly Fourth, Fifth and Sixth amendment federal constitutional guarantees to those accused of criminal offenses."" 4
As a result of this "retrenchment,""14 litigants were soon urged to
"employ their state constitutions to maintain decisional consistancy,"1 42
a strategy which was paradoxically given support by other Burger Court
ingly federalized, state courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured
by state constitutions." Brennan, supra note 100, at 495.
137. Mosk I, supra note 100, at 1084.
138. Brennan, supra note 100, at 495.
Professor Countryman answers his rhetorical question of whether "there is any real need
for a Bill of Rights in a state constitution":
No state, even if it were otherwise willing to abdicate the function of protecting
individual liberty entirely to the federal government, should today be willing to do so
for at least three reasons: (1) Many of the Supreme Court's interpretations of federal
constitutional guarantees applicable to the states are not clearly acceptable today,
much less for the indefinite future. (2) Not all of the federal constitutional guarantees have been held applicable to the states. (3) Modem society is entitled to expect
additional guarantees not to be found in the Constitution of the United States.
Countryman, supra note 133, at 456.
139. See THE BURGER COURT: THE CoUNTER-RnvoLUTIoN THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed.
1983); Nichol, An Activism ofAmbivalence, 98 HARV. L. REv. 315, 317 (1984) (Book Review)
("in short, the majority verdict is that the Burger Court is not so bad"); see also id. at 325 n.4
(discussing other reviews). For a collection of recent articles discussing the Court's record, see
Goodwin, supra note 93, at 267 n.2. For a much earlier analysis, see Abraham, Of Myths,
Motives, Motivations, and Morality: Some Observationson the Burger Court'sRecord on Civil
Rights and Liberties, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 77 (1976).
For a recent exchange on this issue, compare Schmidt, The Rehnquist Court: A Watershed, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1986, § 4, at 27, col. 2, with Fiss, Charting the Supreme Court's
Conservative Drift, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1986, § 4, at 22, col. 3.
140. Greenhalgh, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long and the Short of It,
in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at 15, 17 [hereinafter Greenhalgh I]; see also
Howard, supra note 101, at 874 (While the Burger Court has not been the "wrecking crew that
some thought it would be," in many areas of the law "the difference between where we are
today and where we were at the close of the Warren era is marked and inescapable.").
141. More neutrally, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart Pollock characterizes federal constitutional law as having "changed direction." Pollock II, supra note 100, at 979.
142. Mask I, supra note 100, at 1088; see, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 111-21
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reminding states that they could bestow on their citizens more
rights than compelled by the federal Constitution); Brennan, supra note 100, at 502
("[A]lithough in the past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional
issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state
constitutional questions.").
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cases clarifying that a state was free, as a matter of its own law, to adopt
"individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution."14' 3 Justice Brennan, for one, saw this strategy as a means
of precluding Supreme Court review, 1" as that Court's jurisdiction was

traditionally limited to the correction of errors related solely to questions
of federal law.145
143. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); see also Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). For a list of
relevant cases, see State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 553-54, 423 A.2d 615, 624-25 (1980), appeal
dismissed sub nomL Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
144. See Brennan, supra note 100, at 501 (discussing Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (invalidating municipality's exclusionary zoning ordinance));
see also Ludlow, supra note 103, at 414 ("The state court method of state constitutional reliance insulates decisions from federal judicial review."). According to Justice Mosk, "[the use
of state constitutions is no sport designed to thwart federal review, although that is a salutary
by-product." Mosk III, supra note 104, at 721 (1978); see also Wilkes, The New Federalism in
CriminalProcedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
145. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S.
207 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); Brennan, supra note
100, at 501 n.80.
At the same time, commentators began to question the assumption-articulated by the
Supreme Court in cases such as Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)-that state and federal
courts were equally competent and functionally interchangeable forums for the enforcement of
federal constitutional rights. Such an assumption of parity, Professor Neuborne charged, was
a "dangerous myth," providing a "pretext for funneling federal constitutional decisionmaking
into state courts precisely because they are less likely to be receptive to vigorous enforcement
offederal constitutional doctrine." Neuborne, supra note 33, at 1105-06. Professor Redish has
echoed the same views:
It would be unreasonable to expect state judiciaries to possess a facility equal to that
of the federal courts in adjudicating federal law. Moreover, because federal judges
are guaranteed the independence protections of Article III, while many state judges
are forced to stand for election, we can generally be assured of a greater degree of
independence of the federal judiciary from external political forces.
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 2-3
(1980) (footnotes omitted); cf Gibbons, supra note 132.
For a discussion of the theoretical impact of political concerns on judicial behavior, see
Jacob, JudicialInsulation-Elections,DirectParticipation,and Public Attention to the Courts
in Wisconsin, 1966 WIs. L. Rlv. 801. It may not be coincidental that three of the four states
where state judges are appointed with life tenure-Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and New Jersey-have been classified as states where courts have "a reputation for sympathetic consideration of civil liberties claims" and where state constitutions are relied upon
"to extend protections for individual rights ... broader than those accorded by the Burger
Court." Abrahamson, supra note 120, at 1181 n.162 (1985); (see Tarr & Porter, Gender Equality and JudicialFederalism: The Role of StateAppellate Courts, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 919
(1982)); Neuborne, supra note 33, at 1127 n.8 1; see also id. at 1116 n.45 ("While the evidence is
far from conclusive, it is from among those appellate courts which closely approximate the
independence enjoyed by the federal courts that one finds the state courts which have been
most vigorous in protecting individual rights"). See generally S. ESCOVITZ, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 17-42 (1975).
Professor Welsh has recently written that this "conventional portrait of state judges as
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In Michigan v. Long,14 6 however, the Supreme Court announced
that it will "merely assume that there are no [adequate and independent]
grounds [so as to defeat federal jurisdiction] when it is not clear from the
opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its

decision primarily on federal law."147 As a result of Long and its progeny, 148 a state court must make a "plain statement" that it cited to or
149
discussed federal law for guidance only.
According to Professor Greenhalgh, the Court since Long has
assumed a presumption of dependence on federal law in cases

where state courts have protected the rights of their citizens
under state law... [, going] out of its way to find that rights
granted under state constitutional provisions, which are certainly adequate to support state court judgments, have not been

granted "independent" of an interpretation of federal law.150
personally unsympathetic toward and institutionally incapable of vindicating individual
no longer depicts current realities." Welsh, supra note 101, at 875.

rights

146. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See generally Note, The Use ofState ConstitutionalProvisionsin
CriminalDefense After Michigan v. Long, 65 NEB. L. REv. 605 (1986).

147. Long, 463 U.S. at 1042.
148. Long's progeny is discussed fully in Bamberger, Methodologyfor Raising State ConstitutionalIssues, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at 287, 294-301.
With our dual system of state and federal laws, administered by parallel state
and federal courts, different standards may arise in various areas. But when state
courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the
citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to
ensure rational law enforcement.
Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 638 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (writ of certiorariimprovidently granted) (emphasis in original).
Concludes one student author: "The responsibility for the protection of individual rights
is now primarily a function of the state courts and those who practice in them." Note, supra
note 146, at 630.
149. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has written: "We
hereby make clear that when this court cites federal or other State court opinions in construing
provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes, we rely on those precedents merely
for guidance and do not consider our results bound by those decisions." State v. Ball, 124
N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme Court noted:
Consonant with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v.
Long, we expressly observe that our decision today rests, in part, upon state constitutional grounds independent of federal law. The federal cases that we cite in support
of our interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution "are being used only for the
purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that [this Court] has
reached."
State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 217 n.3, 463 A.2d 320, 324 n.3 (1983) (quoting Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (citation omitted)).
150. Greenhalgh I, supra note 140, at 22; see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727
(1984) ("bobbing"); Florida v. Myers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984) ("weaving"); Colorado v. Nunez,
465 U.S. 324 (1984) (characterizing recent post-Long decisions as "ducking"); Greenhalgh,
Independent and Adequate State Grounds in CriminalLaw and Procedure: Supreme Court
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Justice Pollock, who has subsequently characterized the adequate
and independent state ground requirement as the "most critical question

[facing the United States Supreme Court] in the near future," sees the
lesson of the Long line of cases to be that "[s]tate court judges must

become at least as familiar with their state constitution as they are with
the federal constitution." ' 1 Over a decade ago, Professor Howard concluded his exhaustive study152 with a parallel thought:

[T]he coming of the Burger Court offers an appropriate
time for state courts to reflect on their ancient heritage as inter-

preters of their state charters of liberty and on the ever growing
opportunities to look at those documents to vindicate the rights
of the people of the several states. George Mason and the framers of Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights called for a "fre-

quent recurrence to fundamental principles." It is in that spirit
that successive generations of state53judges breathe continued
1
life into their states' constitutions.
B.

State ConstitutionalLaw Methodologies

Two questions must be considered in any case involving a state constitutional question: (1)
Is the state constitutional question considered
before, after, or simultaneously with the parallel federal constitutional
question, and (2) How should a state judge textually approach a state
constitutional question?
1. State and federal constitutional interplay
At least three separate modes of analyzing state constitutional

claims have emerged. 154 First, some courts employ a "dual reliance" system155 by which they find support for their decisions in both the state
and the federal constitutions.1 56 While Washington Supreme Court JusPerspective (1983-1984), in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at 11-14 [hereinafter
Greenhalgh II]. But see People v. Van Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
875 (1985).
151. Pollock II, supra note 100, at 992.
152. Howard, supra note 101.
153. Id. at 943-44 (footnote omitted).
154. Pollock II, supra note 100, at 983-86; see also Pollock I, supra note 100, at 718-19.
155. See Deukmejian and Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the
CaliforniaConstitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 996-97 (1979).
156. See, e.g., State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d
364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge James L. Oakes has characterized Badger and other Vermont decisions as "a fine example for some of the other states,
and indeed perhaps for the Supreme Court of the United States itself, of what the Bill of Rights
really means, or should mean." Oakes, State Courts in a Time of Federal Constitutional
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tice Robert F. Utter has praised this approach as "benefit[ing] both the
' Michigan v. Long"'8 and its progeny 59
state and federal judiciaries," 157
seemingly call into question the future vitality of this doctrine.
Second, other courts employ the "primacy" approach, by which a
court looks first to its own state constitution in matters involving funda-

mental liberties, and where federal constitutional issues are considered
only if it is found that the infringement in question is permitted under the
state constitution. 160 According to Justice Pollock, this approach is
"consistent with the proposition that state constitutions are the basic
charters of individual liberties" and is consistent with "efficient judicial
16 1
management."
Third, under the "supplemental" or "interstitial" approach, a court

looks first to the federal Constitution, and only consults the state constitution if the question is unclear under the federal Constitution or if the
asserted violation of the litigant's rights is valid under that Constitu-

tion.162 Justice Pollock views this approach as "particularly useful... in
cases involving more than one set of fundamental rights."1'63
Change, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at 377, 400. The Badger court was
specific:
Although the Vermont and federal constitutions "have a common origin and a similar purpose," our constitution is not a mere reflection of the federal charter. Historically and textually, it differs from the United States Constitution. It predates the
federal counterpart, as it extends back to Vermont's days as an independent republic.
It is an independent authority, and Vermont's fundamental law.
Badger, 141 Vt. at 448-49, 450 A.2d at 347 (quoting State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 151, 385 A.2d
1085, 1088 (1978) (citation omitted)).
157. Utter, supra note 100, at 1047.
158. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
160. See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981); State v. Ball, 124 N.H.
226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984).
161. Pollock II, supra note 100, at 984.
162. See, eg., State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983).
163. Pollock II, supra note 100, at 984; see, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193
(1957) (finding it "intolerable" to force criminal defendant to abandon a fourth amendment
right in order to assert an independent fifth amendment guarantee); Perlin, Another "Incredible Dilemma" Psychiatric Assistance and Self-Incrimination, 1985-86 ABA PREVIEW OF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES, Mar. 14, 1987, No. 10, at 288; Westen, Incredible
Dilemmas: Conditioning One ConstitutionalRight on the Forfeitureof Another, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 741 (1981). Justice Pollock concludes: "As a practical matter, it may be unimportant
whether a court looks initially or secondarily to the state constitution as long as it knows what
the state constitution means, understands what that constitution demands, and makes a plain
statement that it is relying on the state constitution." Pollock, supra note 100, at 985. But see
Schmid, 84 N.J. at 569, 575, 423 A.2d at 633, 636 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for "gratuitously" deciding that criminal trespass conviction would be upheld under federal Constitution).
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2. Textual analysis
Professor Howard has suggested that there are at least seven factors
that a state court judge should consider in construing a question of state

constitutional law. 164 First, the textual language of the document itself
may justify a broader reading of the state constitution than the United

States Supreme Court has given to its federal counterpart. 165 In some
cases, a provision of the state constitution will contain "more sweeping"
language than its federal counterpart;1 66 in others, the state constitution
will explicitly provide specific rights' 67 in areas where there is no federal
textual counterpart (e.g., education, 168 environment1 69 and rights of the

handicapped). 170
Second, even if the language is identical, legislative history, such as

study commission reports and floor debates, may reveal an intention that
will support reading a state provision differently than its federal counterpart.1 7 1 Even absent such interpretative tools, differing interpretations
are possible; as the New Jersey Supreme Court has noted:
Even if the language of the state constitutional and federal

constitutional provisions were identical, this Court could give
differing interpretations to the provisions.... As Justice Mosk
of the California Supreme Court has observed, "[i]t is a fiction

too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of
Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first
164. Howard, supra note 101, at 935-41.
165. Id. at 935.
166. See, e.g., Schmid, 84 N.J. at 556-60, 423 A.2d at 626-28 (discussing New Jersey's freedom of speech provision).
167. See Galie, supra note 101, at 734-35.
168. See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1.
169. See, eg., MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. For a fascinating analysis of litigation under the
Montana state constitution, see Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-TheMontana Disaster, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1095 (1985).
170. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; MONT. CONsT. art. XII, § 3(2). Constitutional provisions are collected in Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally 11 Under State Constitutions, 45
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., at 7, 23 n.91 (Summer 1982).
This expanded specific articulation of rights is not always seen as entirely salutary:
"Other rights range from the radical, like New Hampshire's recognition of a constitutional
right to revolution, see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 10, to the ridiculous, like California's constitutional guarantee of a right to fish, see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25." Galie, supra note 101, at 734
n.26.
171. Howard, supra note 101, at 936.
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' x7
state constitutions, rather than the reverse." 1
Third, a state's history and traditions should be considered, in an

effort to determine if the state constitutional provision was meant to reflect a "sense of local uniqueness."

173

Fourth, "Is]tate courts should con-

sider the nature of the subject matter in litigation and the interests
affected by the local political process." 17 4 As Professor Sager has pointed

out:
It is not an accident that judges in New Jersey should have a
distinct read on the application of principles of social justice to
problems of municipal land use, [or] that judges in a large and
diverse state like California should be moved first to curb ineq175
uities in the financing of public education ....
Fifth, state courts may consider whether the United States Supreme
Court has demonstrated a "hands-off" attitude towards a particular clas172. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 557 n.8, 423 A.2d at 626 n.8 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 (1975)).
173. Howard, supra note 101, at 936-37. The most famous case in this line interpreted the
Alaska state constitutional section guaranteeing a right of privacy, see ALASKA CONST. art. I,
§ 22, in light of the "character of life in Alaska," to give Alaskan citizens the right to possess
and use marijuana in their own homes unless the state could show a substantial state interest in
prohibiting such use. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 502-04 (Alaska 1975). The court stressed:
Our territory and now state has traditionally been the home of people who prize their
individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in order to
achieve a measure of control over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister states.
Id. at 504. Ravin is discussed in Howard, supra note 101, at 932-33. For other like examples,
see, e.g., State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974) (jury trial for minor criminal offenses); In re
Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 852 (1971) (jury of twelve); State ex
rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890) (church/state separation); Howard,
supra note 101, at 903-04.
174. Howard, supra note 101, at 937.
175. Sager, Foreword: State Courts andthe StrategicSpace Between the Norms and Rules of
ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tnx. L. REV.959, 975 (1985). Judge Pollock suggests:
[S]tate courts are a more appropriate forum than federal courts for defining a municipality's power to zone and its responsibility to provide a realistic opportunity for low
and moderate income housing. State courts provide a preferred forum not because
state judges are more sensitive to fundamental rights than are federal judges, but
because state courts are not obligated to a national constituency in the same way as
are federal courts. Furthermore, state courts can respond more readily to local conditions. As difficult as it may be to develop constitutional principles to govern the
exercise of zoning power in a given state, how much more difficult it would be to
define and enforce a single set of constitutional obligations to govern an entire nation.
Pollock I, supra note 100, at 717. But see Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protectionsof Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REv. 305-06 (1985) ("Unfortunately, in some ways, the movement toward the 'rebirth' of state constitutions has become a
juggernaut and poses the same dangers as any movement with no destination.") (footnotes
omitted); Maltz, supra note 101 (criticizing the state-by-state development of free expression
law).
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sification of problems, 176 as with substantive due process involving economic regulation.1 77 Sixth, because state constitutions are amended "to
reflect changing values" 178 more easily and frequently than their federal
counterpart, 17 9 it can be argued that the state documents respond more

contemporaneously to "the felt needs of each generation" and thus
should be read in this context.1 80
Finally, the "honored"'' 8 1 tradition of the individual "courageous"
82
state as the "laboratory" for "novel social and economic experiments"'1

can be seen as a clarion cry for "innovation and diversity among state
courts,"' 1 3 notwithstanding the ambiguous relationship1 84 between Jus-

tice Brandeis' "laboratory" vision and the Burger Court's embrace of a
"new federalism"

'

in the aftermath of Younger v. Harris'8 6 and its

progeny.
In addition to Professor Howard's arguments, other commentators
have suggested one final justification for independent state constitutional
analysis: the increasingly fractious and diffuse decision-making process
of the Burger Court.18 7 Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans A. Linde'

has noted pointedly: "A lot of Supreme Court decisions are no longer
persuasive, but filled with fuzzy, soft terminology which has no cutting
edge .... When the Court's doctrinal cogency and coherency begins to
fall apart, we have state courts saying, in effect, 'We don't have to do it
176. Howard, supra note 101, at 938.
177. This area has been, in the words of Professor Galie, "well analyzed" by the commentators. Galie, supra note 101, at 774; see also id. n.276 (collecting authorities). For a full recent
analysis of this area, see Malina, Substantive Due Process-State ConstitutionalProtection in
the Economic Area, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at 101.
178. Howard, supra note 101, at 939.
179. See, eg., Adrian, Trends in State Constitutions, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 313-20
(1968); Graves, supra note 103.
180. Howard, supra note 101.
181. Id. at 940.
182. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 21.
183. Howard, supra note 101, at 940.
184. See Welsh, supra note 101, at 875 ("The [United States Supreme] Court's insensitive
approach to the demands of independent constitutional interpretation has resulted in the exercise of federal judicial review in a manner that thwarts the very innovative forces that the
Black/Brandeis conception endeavors to protect.").
185. See Wright, supra note 100, at 182-83.
186. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See generally WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at 22936 (3d ed. 1979). For an excellent recent analysis recommending abandonment of the Younger
doctrine, see Zeigler, FederalCourt Reform of State CriminalJustice Systems: A Reassessment
of the Younger DoctrineFrom a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 31 (1985).
187. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (unanimous decision) with
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (six opinions).
188. See generally Linde, supra note 100.
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that way.' -189
In short, there can no longer be any doubt as to the importance of
state constitutional doctrine in any question involving state regulation of
civil liberties. It can only be expected that litigants representing the mentally disabled will turn more and more to state constitutional provisions
in the future. 190
C. Rights Under State Constitutions
Four years ago, Professor Alan Meisel characterized state constitutions as a "virtually untapped source of rights" and perhaps "the most
promising source of rights" for the mentally disabled in this decade. 91
He surveyed then recent United States Supreme Court case law, includ194
93
ing O'Connorv. Donaldson,192 Parham v. J.R., Addington v. Texas,
Youngberg v. Romeo 9 5 and Mills v. Rogers.196 Professor Meisel concluded that, as that Court could not "be relied upon to break new consti-

tutional ground in securing rights to psychiatric patients on the civil side
of the mental health system,"' 97 the only "reliable sanctuary from
Supreme Court review lies in the state courts' ability to decide cases exclusively on the basis of state law."' 98
While Professor Meisel was able to find only a scattering of such
cases' 99 (some of which were ambiguous as to the source of declared

rights),2 "° he characterized state constitutional law as "a much overlooked source of substantive rights for persons in the mental health system," '0 1 and underscored that lawyers representing such persons

"plainly have a duty to raise state law claims" in addition to federal

189. Margolick, State JudiciariesAre Shaping Law That Goes Beyond Supreme Court, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1982, at Al, col. 1, B8 col. 1.
190. See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
191. Meisel, supra note 170, at 9.
192. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See generally supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
193. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See generally supra text accompanying note 50.
194. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See generally supra text accompanying note 49.
195. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See generally supra text accompanying notes 62, 64-66, 70.
196. 457 U.S. 291 (1982). See generally infra text accompanying notes 545-50.
197. Meisel, supra note 170, at 15.
198. Id. at 16; see also Landmark, supra note 93, at 149 (Because the Supreme Court's
decision in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), "may discourage plaintiffs
from pursuing their federal rights concerning education for handicapped children, [it
is suggested] that plaintiffs turn to state law to ensure an adequate education for handicapped
children.").
199. Meisel noted the significant methodological research difficulties in searching for and
identifying all such cases. Meisel, supra note 170, at 24 n.94.
200. See, eg., id. at 12 n.31 (discussing New Jersey cases).
201. Id. at 39-40.
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claims.20 2
Although there has been no subsequent explosion of either state
constitutional litigation or academic commentary 20 3 in the intervening
four years, a modest body of law has developed, especially in the area of
the right to refuse treatment. 2 ° Given the general scholarly and judicial
impetus towards further state constitutional law developments, 20 5 and

given the Supreme Court's recent hostility towards institutional reform
litigation, 0 6 it seems likely that there will be further growth in this area.
1. Procedural rights in the civil commitment process
Several courts have considered the applicability of state constitu-

tional provisions to the involuntary civil commitment process. In one of
the earliest 20 7 and broadest readings of any such state constitutional provision, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared significant

portions of that state's involuntary civil commitment statutes unconstitutional. 20 The West Virginia court held that the statutes failed to provide
both substantive due process limitations on the commitment power20 9
and procedural due process protections including the right to be present

at the commitment hearing, the right to meaningful confrontation and
cross-examination, and the right to a full transcript to guarantee mean-

ingful judicial review. 210 To support its holdings, the court relied on
both state and federal constitutional due process provisions, 21 which it
characterized as "the most 212
advanced mechanisms for fairness which juridical science can create.,
The Connecticut Supreme Court has read that state's constitution to

mandate that involuntarily confined individuals receive periodic and continuing judicial reviews of the propriety of their commitment.21 3 In the
202. Id. at 40.
203. The only survey done since Meisel's is Schwartz, State ConstitutionalDue Process
Rights?, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 102, at 181, 196-201.
204. See infra notes 233-95 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 154-90 and accompanying text.
206. See, eg., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). See
generally supra notes 1-99 and accompanying text.
207. The decision by the West Virgnia Supreme Judicial Court in State ex rel. Hawks v.
Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974), was issued at the height of what I refer to as
the "golden age of federal litigation" on behalf of the mentally disabled.
208. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2 (1931).
209. Hawks, 157 W. Va. at 422-36, 202 S.E.2d at 115-23.
210. Id. at 441-47, 202 S.E.2d at 125-28.
211. Id. at 435, 202 S.E.2d at 122 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. V, and W. VA. CONST. art.
III, § 10 (1872)).
212. Id. at 426, 202 S.E.2d at 117.
213. Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 476-82, 378 A.2d 553, 555-57 (1977). Fasulo relied
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subsequent words of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Connecticut
court "eloquently
stated" the "compelling reasons" in support of its
14
2

position:

Freedom from involuntary confinement for those who
have committed no crime is the natural state of individuals in
this country. The burden must be placed on the state to prove
the necessity of stripping the citizen of one of his most fundamental rights, and the risk of error must rest on the state. 1 5
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals relied on both state and federal constitutional provisions in ruling that basic procedural due process
216 and that such
protections applied to the civil commitment process,
21 7
punitive.
not
"therapeutic,
be
commitment must
Elsewhere, the Kentucky Court of Appeals interpreted its state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to confrontation in criminal
prosecutions2 1 8 to apply equally to civil commitment hearings (there denominated "lunacy inquests"), 2 19 noting simply that the right was "also
'2 2 0
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
On the question of the right of a person facing civil commitment to a
jury trial, courts have split in their interpretations of state constitutional
provisions. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, after carefully
examining the historical development of both the state constitution and
the right to a trial by jury,2 21 refused to read that state's constitutional
2 23
due process provision22 2 to so guarantee that right.
on the due process guarantees of both the state constitution, CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8, and on
such constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court, as O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
214. State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 300, 390 A.2d 574, 583 (1978).
215. Fasulo, 173 Conn. at 481, 378 A.2d at 557.
216. Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 166-67, 305 N.E.2d 903, 905-06, 350
N.Y.S.2d 889, 892-93 (1973).
217. Id. at 166, 305 N.E.2d at 905, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 892. The court relied on the New York
state constitution which provides in pertinent part: "The care and treatment of persons suffering from mental disorder or defect and the protection of the mental health of the inhabitants of
the state may be provided by state and local authorities and in such manner as the legislature
may from time to time determine." N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 4.
218. Ky. CONST. § 11.
219. Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1964).
220. Id. at 683.
221. Markey v. Wachtel, 264 S.E.2d 437, 439-43 (W. Va. 1979).
222. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
223. Markey, 264 S.E.2d at 443. The court stressed that if the framers of the West Virginia
Constitution had intended for the due process provision to provide for jury trials in all cases,
there would have been no need for two other state constitutional provisions that mandated jury
trials in "suits at common law" or in cases involving "crimes and misdemeanors." Id. at 441;
see also W. VA. CONST. art III, §§ 13, 14.
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On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found there was
no justification under state or federal equal protection grounds22 4 in denying a jury trial under a subsequently repealed sex offender recommitment statute225 when such a trial was guaranteed by statute to persons
facing involuntary civil commitment. 226 And the California Supreme
Court held that a person in peril of being declared "gravely disabled"

pursuant to state law was entitled to a unanimous jury verdict in any
equal protection provisions of both the state
such adjudication under the
227
and federal constitutions.
In other cases, courts have relied on state constitutional provisions
as a source of rights in construing other procedural aspects of the com-

mitment process. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that
because of the "grievous loss" attendant upon an erroneous commitment
decision, the state constitution 22 8 mandated a burden of beyond a reasonable doubt at an involuntary commitment hearing,22 9 both as to determi-

nations of mental illness and potential dangerousness.230 The California
Supreme Court applied state constitutional law in holding that a statutory scheme permitting the indefinite placement in a state hospital of
nonprotesting developmentally disabled adults violated both the equal
protection and due process provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.2 3 1 The court concluded:
224. State ex rel Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 158-62, 207 N.W.2d 809, 813-15 (1973).
The court noted that "[tihe United States and Wisconsin Constitutions are similar with respect
to the due process and equal protection clauses." Id. at 158 n.20, 207 N.W.2d at 813 n.20.
225. For the chronology of the statute involved, see State v. Combined Community Servs.
Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 87 n.12, 362 N.W.2d 104, 115 n.12 (1985).
226. Farrell,59 Wis. 2d at 168-69, 207 N.W.2d at 815-19; see also Community Sen's. Bd.,
122 Wis. 2d at 87-90, 362 N.W.2d at 114-16 (state and federal constitutions similar due process and equal protection provisions (citing State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 158
n.20, 207 N.W.2d 809, 813 n.20)).
227. Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 231, 590 P.2d 1, 8, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 432
(1979).
228. See N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15.
229. Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 934-35, 380 A.2d 673, 677-78 (1977).
230. Id. at 935, 380 A.2d at 677-78. Subsequently, that court relied on the state constitution to strike down a state statute which had created an irrebuttable presumption of dangerousness in cases involving recommitment of persons initially committed following a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity. See State v. Robb, 125 N.H. 581, 585-89, 484 A.2d 1130,
1132-35 (1984).
231. In re Hop, 29 Cal. 3d 82, 94, 623 P.2d 282, 288-89, 171 Cal. Rptr. 721, 727-28 (1983).
The court stressed that state law providing that developmentally disabled persons "'have the
same legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed all other individuals by the Federal Constitution and laws and the Constitution and laws of the State of California'" is "but a legislative
reaffirmation of a firmly rooted and independent constitutional principle which assures that
persons will not be deprived of due process or equal protection of the law on the basis of
developmental disability alone." Id. at 89, 623 P.2d at 286, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 725 (quoting
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Neither the benevolent intent of the Legislature, nor of those

involved in the care of the developmentally disabled, nor the
force of the legislative directive mandating the least restrictive
placements for the developmentally disabled... renders constitutional the legislative scheme which denies them the procedural safeguards of a hearing which is uniformly extended to

other potential wards.232
2. The right to refuse treatment
While most of the case law2 33 and scholarly and academic attenpaid to the scope of the right to refuse treatment has focused on
the application of the federal Constitution,235 several courts have found a
tion 234

state constitutional right to refuse treatment.236 Most recently, the New
York Court of Appeals has issued what appears to be the broadest right
to refuse treatment opinion yet decided by an appellate court, and the
broadest opinion decided by any court on the topic since the Third Cir-

cuit's remand opinion in Rennie v. Klein.237 In Rivers v. Katz, 238 New
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4502 (West 1984)). The court cited prior cases decided under

the California Constitution, holding that "'personal liberty is a fundamental interest, second
only to life itself.'" Id. (quoting People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 551 P.2d 375, 384, 131
Cal. Rptr. 55, 64 (1976)).
232. Id. at 93, 623 P.2d at 289, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citation omitted).
233. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650
(Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on
remand,738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F.
Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (supplemental opinion), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d
Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.
1983).
234. See, e.g., Brooks, The ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 8 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980); Gelman, Mental HospitalDrugs, Professionalism
and the Constitution, 72 GEO. L.J. 1725 (1984); Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Drugs, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 363 (1980); see also Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic
Orgy: Mental Patients'Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. Rv. 461 (1977). See generally REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS (Doudera & Swazey 1979)
[hereinafter REFUSING TREATMENT]. But see Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized
Mental Health Patients'Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107 (1985)
(surveying state decisions).
235. In addition to the constitutional theories ultimately relied upon in Rennie and Rogers,
see Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (articulating alternative constitutional theories). For consideration of common-law theories in support of the right to refuse treatment,
see Plotkin, supra note 234, at 485-90; Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication
of the InstitutionalizedMentally IIl, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720 (1982).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 238-95. This material is adapted, in large part,
from Perlin, supra note 72.
237. 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
238. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986). On July 10, 1986, defend-
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York's highest state court ordered, in most cases,239 ajudicial "determination of whether the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned deci-

sion with respect to proposed treatment before the drugs may be
administered pursuant to the State's parenspatriaepower. '"240 The Riv-

ers court based its decision solely upon state constitutional and common
law grounds, 24 1 involving (1) a broader class of drugs than any prior
opinion, 24 2 and (2)a regulatory scheme already approved
in large part on
24 3

federal constitutional grounds by the second circuit.
Rivers was a consolidated action brought on behalf of three 2 ' invol246
untarily 24 5 committed patients at Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center
who attempted2 4 7 to refuse the administration of certain antipsychotic

ants moved for a rehearing; at the time of the writing of this article, there was no decision by
the court of appeals on that motion.
239. Where a patient presents a danger to self or others or
engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within the institution, the
state may be warranted, in the exercise of its police power, in administering antipsychotic medication over the patient's objections. The most obvious example of this
is an emergency situation, such as when there is imminent danger to a patient or
others in the immediate vicinity.
Id. at 495-96, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 492-95, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79.
242. Rivers appears to be the first case involving a patient complaining about the administration of lithium. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77; cf Mills, 457 U.S. at 293
n.1 (adopting classification used by First Circuit in Rogers); Rennie, 653 F.2d at 839 n.2
("drugs such as lithium are not considered here"); Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653 n.1 (case exclusively concerned with antipsychotic drugs such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin, and Haldol;
drugs such as lithium not covered); Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262-63, 239 N.W.2d
905, 913 (1976) (While procedural due process hearing required prior to the imposition of
electroshock therapy or other "more intrusive forms of treatment," such procedures
"[c]ertainly [are] not intended to apply to the use of mild tranquilizers or those therapies
requiring the cooperation of the patient.").
243. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979-81 (2d Cir. 1983), discussed infra
note 288 and infra text accompanying notes 280-81.
244. The trial court's denial of class certification was affirmed "since application of the
principles of stare decisis will adequately protect subsequent litigants." Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at
499, 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
245. See N.Y. MENTAL HYO. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1978). See generally id. §§ 9.01-.59
(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987).
246. Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center is a New York state mental hospital. Rivers, 67
N.Y.2d at 490, 495 N.E.2d at 339, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
247. Each patient unsuccessfully invoked the state's administrative procedures governing
refusal of medication by state hospital patients. Id. at 490-91, 495 N.E.2d at 339-40, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 76-77. Under state regulations, before such treatment is ordered over a patient's
objection, the decision to medicate must be reviewed by "the head of the service." 14 N.Y.
COMP.CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.8(c) (1986). Aggrieved patients then have a right to a
counseled appeal before the facility director. Id. § 27.8(d), (e)(1). That decision may then be
appealed to the regional director of the state department of mental hygiene. Id. § 27.8(e)(3).
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In each instance, after the court overrode the patients'

objections and the medications were involuntarily administered, the patients filed declaratory judgment actions2 4 9 against the state commis-

sioner of mental hygiene and hospital officials "to enjoin the
nonconsensual administration of antipsychotic drugs and to obtain a dec-

laration of their common-law and constitutional right to refuse
medication."2 '
Reversing the trial court's dismissal, the court of appeals held that
the due process clause of the state constitution2 5 1 "affords involuntarily
committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic
medication," 25' 2 and that "neither mental illness nor institutionalization
per se can stand as a justification for overriding an individual's fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic medication on either police power or
parenspatriae grounds."2'53
First, the court restated the "firmly established" and "faithfully adhered to" common-law principles25 4 that "every individual 'of adult
248. Plaintiff Rivers was medicated with Prolixin Hydrochloride, Prolixin Decanoate, and
Mellaril. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. Plaintiff Zatz was
medicated with Navene and lithium, and plaintiff Grassi was medicated with Prolixin Hydrochloride. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The court discussed both the
usefulness and the side effects of antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 490 n.1, 495 N.E.2d at 339 n.1,
504 N.Y.S.2d at 76 n.1. The administration of lithium-a drug first administered in 1949 and
given to ameliorate manic episodes in patients with manic-depressive illness-was not speciftically challenged in any of the cases cited by the court. See Cade, Lithium Salts in the Treatment of Psychotic Excitement, 36 MED. J. AusT. 349 (1949); Fieve, Lithium Therapy, in 2
FREEDMAN, KAPLAN & SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY If 1982 (2d
ed. 1975).
249. Plaintiffs Rivers and Zatz filed one action, while plaintiff Grassi filed a separate action.
Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
250. Id. The trial court had dismissed plaintiffs' complaints, on the theory that "the involuntary retention orders necessarily determined that these patients were so impaired by their
mental illness that they were unable to competently make a choice in respect to their treatment," id., and the Appellate Division affirmed for the reasons stated by the trial court in
Rivers v. Katz, 112 A.D.2d 926, 491 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1985), rev'd, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d
337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
251. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals had
refused to construe the state constitution more expansively than the United States Supreme
Court had interpreted the parallel provision of the federal Constitution in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496,488 N.E.2d
1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985) (free speech provision of state constitution did not preclude mall
owner from enforcing, in the absence of state action, blanket no-handbilling policy). All relevant cases are discussed in Ragosta, Free Speech Access to ShoppingMalls UnderState Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1986).
252. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
253. Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
254. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The court added that these principles were also recognized by the state legislature. Id. (citing N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
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years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body' ,"255and to control the course of his medical treatment.25 6

In the case of competent patients, this "fundamental" right, which is coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the state constitution's due process clause,2 57 must be honored "even though the recommended treatment may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the
258

patient's life."
The court specifically rejected defendants' argument that involuntarily committed mental patients were "presumptively incompetent" to ex-

ercise this right because involuntary commitment included an implicit
determination "that the patient's illness has so impaired his judgment as

to render him incapable of making decisions regarding treatment and
care." 2 59 Without more, neither the fact of mental illness nor the fact of
commitment "constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that [such pa§§ 2504, 2805-d (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 4401-a (McKinney
Supp. 1987); N.Y. CoMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.25(a)(7) (1986)).
The cited sections provide for informed consent of adult individuals in situations involving "medical, dental, health and hospital services," N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(l) (McKinney 1985), set out the elements of and defenses to a medical malpractice claim based on an
alleged lack ofinformed consent, id. § 2805-d(l) to (4), set the standard upon which to assess a
motion for judgment at the end of plaintiff's case in such an action, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
4401-a, and mandate that hospitals establish written policies affording patients the right to
"refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law and to be informed of the medical consequences of [their] action[s]," 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.25(a)(7).
255. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492,495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (quoting Schloendorff
v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
256. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The court cited
Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93 (except in the case of an emergency, every
patient has a common right to determine what should be done with his own body) and In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)
("right to die" case, holding that, where, prior to becoming incompetent, an elderly patient
had consistently expressed his desire not to have his life prolonged by medical means if there
was no hope for recovery, it was proper for the court to approve discontinuance of a respirator
on which he was being maintained in a permanent vegetative state).
257. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78; see also Cooper v.
Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984
(1980) (applying due process clause of state constitution to question of adequacy of jail conditions); cf.Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (inmate rights under federal Constitution).
258. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (citing In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1981)). The court added:
In our system of a free government, where notions of individual autonomy and
free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must have the final say in respect to
decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible
protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with
the furtherance of his own desires .... This right extends equally to mentally ill
persons who are not to be treated as persons of lesser status or dignity because of
their illness.
Id.
259. Id.
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tients] lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of their
decision to refuse medication that poses a significant risk to their physical
' z6
well-being. 2
On the other hand, the court recognized that the right to reject an-

tipsychotic medication was not absolute, and that, under certain circumstances, it might have to yield to compelling state interests:2 6 ' in an
"emergency situation" where the patient was an "imminent danger to
[another] patient or others in the immediate vicinity,"2 6 or, under the
state's parenspatriaepower where an individual is "incapable of making
a competent decision concerning treatment on his own ... [and] lacks
260. Id. at 494, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79; see also Rennie, 653 F.2d at
846 n.12 ("It is simply not true that all persons involuntarily committed are always incapable
of making a rational decision on treatment ....
Psychiatric literature indicates that many
forms of mental illness have a highly specific impact on the victims, leaving decision-making
capacity and reasoning ability largely unimpaired."); Rogers, 634 F.2d at 658-59.
The court in Rivers added that it was "well-accepted" that mental illness "often strikes
only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired," and, as a result, "many
mentally ill persons retain the capacity to function in a competent manner." 67 N.Y.2d at 494,
495 N.E.2d at 342-43, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
In fact, the court stressed, the "nearly unanimous modem trend" in the courts and among
both medical and legal commentators is to recognize "that there is no significant relationship
between the need for hospitalization of mentally ill patients and their ability to make treatment
decisions." Id. at 494 & nn. 4-5, 495 N.E.2d at 342 & nn. 4-5, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 & nn. 4-5.
It concluded on this point by quoting Professor Brooks: "'[T]here is ample evidence that
many patients, despite their mental illness are capable of making rational and knowledgeable
decisions about medications. The fact that a mental patient may disagree with the psychiatrist's judgment about the benefit of medication outweighing the cost does not make the patient's decision incompetent.'" Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (quoting
Brooks, ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 191 (1980)).
261. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
262. Id. Under state regulations, facilities may treat objecting patients "where the treatment appears necessary to avoid serious harm to life or limb of the patients themselves or
others." N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 14, § 27.8(b)(1) (1986); see also id. § 27.8(b)(3).
This exception, the court explained, was premised on the state's police power. Rivers, 67
N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80. It noted, however, that no such claim
was advanced by defendants in the case before it. Id. In a footnote, the court explained what
this exception does not include:
Any implication that State interests unrelated to the patient's well-being or
those around him can outweigh his fundamental autonomy interest is rejected. Thus,
the State's interest in providing a therapeutic environment, in preserving the time
and resources of the hospital staff, in increasing the process of deinstitutionalization
and in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, while important,
cannot outweigh the fundamental individual rights here asserted. It is the needs and
desires of the individual, not the requirements of the institution, that are paramount.
Id. at 495 n.6, 495 N.E.2d at 343 n.6, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 n.6. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 324 (1982), the Court stated that "[i]n deciding this case, we have weighed those
postcommitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraintsunder
which most state institutionsnecessarily operate." Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
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the capacity to decide for himself whether he should take the drugs.' ,263

The court reasoned that prior judicial determination in the latter
group of cases should be in the nature of a de novo hearing, following
exhaustion of the state's administrative review procedures. 2 64 At this

counseled 265 hearing, the state bears the burden of demonstrating, by
clear and convincing evidence,26 6 the patient's incapacity to make a treatment decision.2 67 If the court determines that the patient has the capability of making his own treatment decision, the state is precluded from
administering such drugs.2 6 8 On the other hand, if the court determines
the patient lacks such capacity
the court must determine whether the proposed treatment is

narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests, the benefits to be
gained from the treatment, the adverse side effects associated
with the treatment and any less intrusive alternative treatments. The State would bear the burden to establish by clear
263. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (quoting Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1980)).
This determination, the court underscored, "is uniquely a judicial, not a medical function." Id. Due process thus requires that "a court balance the individual's liberty interest
against the State's asserted compelling need on the facts of each case to determine whether
such medication may be forcibly administered." Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d
at 81 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 308, 390 A.2d 574, 587 (1978) ("The
final decision on the need for and appropriate extent of restrictions on the committee's liberty
is for the court, not the psychiatrists.") (emphasis in original).
264. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 97, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
265. Id. (citing N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(l)(a) (McKinney 1983)) (counsel may be assigned in
civil commitment proceedings if the court is satisfied the individual is financially unable to
obtain counsel).
266. Id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (intermediate burden of
proof constitutionally mandated at civil commitment hearings used where "interests at stake
...are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money").
267. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 97, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
268. Id. The court listed eight factors that might be considered in evaluating an individual's capability to consent to or refuse treatment:
(1) the person's knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) the patient's ability to
understand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages; (3) the patient's cognitive capacity to consider the relevant factors; (4) the absence of any interfering pathologic perception or belief, such as a delusion concerning the decision; (5)
the absence of any interfering emotional state, such as severe manic depression, euphoria or emotional disability; (6) the absence of any interfering pathologic motivational pressure; (7) the absence of any interfering pathologic relationship, such as the
conviction of helpless dependency on another person; (8) an awareness of how others
view the decision, the general social attitude toward the choices and an understanding of his reason for deviating from that attitude if he does.
Id. at n.7 (citing Michels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN
MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS 115, 117-18 (Douden & Swazey 1979)).
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and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment meets
these criteria.26 9
The court concluded that the state administrative review procedures
failed to meet state consitutional muster.27 The regulations were deficient in that they did not articulate "the standards to be followed or criteria to be considered at each stage of the administrative process" in such
matters as the patient's need for a particular drug, whether the drug is
the "least intrusive, whether it is capable of producing the least serious
side effects, and the proper length of its use."27' 1
Finally, the court ruled that state law mandating that hospital professional staff act "'within the scope of professional license' ,,272 applied
to the administrative process. It further held that such "medical determinations as to the need to administer antipsychotic drugs must honor
the patient's due process rights and be made in accordance with accepted
professional judgment, practice and standards."2 7' 3
Rivers is an important case for six reasons. First, on the merits,
there is virtually nothing in the opinion acknowledging the split2 74 in the
way courts have construed the right to refuse treatment following the
Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Rogers2 75 and the Third Circuit's
Rennie v. Klein remand decision.2 76 While there is a "but see" citation to
Stensvad v. Reivitz 2 7 on the question of the relationship between institu269. Id. at 497-98, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
270. Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
271. Id. The court noted that:
The absence of any standard for determining the permissible duration of forced medication [was] particularly disturbing. Manifestly, when the medication is necessitated
by the patient's dangerousness, a circumstance that would implicate the State's police
power interest, it may well be that the need would continue only for so long as the
dangerous condition exists. The determination would not necessarily imply incapacity and thus would not provide a justifiable basis for the exercise of the State'sparens
patriaeauthority to override the patient's objection or to continue the medication for
a protracted period. When the medication is determined to be necessary in order to
care for a patient who is unable to care for himself because of mental illness, the
State's parenspatriaepower would be implicated, which, as we have said, may only
be employed when it has been determined that the patient is unable to make a treatment decision.
Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344-45, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
272. Id., 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 33.03(b)(3) (McKinney 1978)). Under this section of the mental health law, "in order to
assure protection of patients in their care and treatment [there must be an] order of a staff
member operating within the scope of a professional license for any treatment or therapy based
on appropriate examination." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(b)(3).

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
See generally Perlin, supra note 72.
457 U.S. 291; see also Perlin,supra note 74, at 7-8, 19-20 nn.126-34.
Rennie, 720 F.2d 266; see also Perlin, supra note 72.
601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis. 1985); see also Perlin,supra note 72.
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27 8

a reading of
Rivers alone would give little indication of the range of developments in
the right to refuse treatment since 1982.279
Second, Rivers makes no mention of Project Release v. Prevost,2" a
Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion which upheld on federal consti-

tionalization and treatment decision-making

capacity

tutional grounds"' the regulation struck down on state constitutional
grounds by the Rivers court. The absence of any mention of Project Release is thus particularly stark. Third, the expansion of the class of drugs

covered by the opinion to include lithium282 is a significant quantitative
and qualitative increase in the universe of drugging decisions in which
constitutional due process decisions are now implicated.28 3
Fourth, the use in Rivers of a pre-administration judicial hearing-

like that ordered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the
Rogers remand 2 4 -is a ringing endorsement of thejudicial model in an
area where it appears likely that the United States Supreme Court would

accept a more informal, medically-focused model so as to adequately satisfy the demands of the due process clause of the federal Constitution.2 85
278. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 494 n.4, 495 N.E.2d at 342 n.4, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 n.4.
279. The year of remand in Mills and Rennie was 1982. Mills, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie,
458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
280. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
281. Id. at 980-81.
282. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
283. There are important clinical side effect issues raised by the use of lithium. See, eg.,
Bar, Nathan, Brenner & Horowitz, Nonspecific StomatitisDue to Lithium Therapy, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1126 (1985) (letter to the editor); Cohen & Cohen, Lithium Carbonate,Haloperidol, and Irreversible Brain Damage, 230 J.AM. MED. A. 1283 (1974); Crews & Carpenter,
Lithium-Induced Aggravation of Tardive Dyskinesia, 134 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 933 (1977);
Kane, ExtrapyramidalSide Effects with Lithium Treatment, 135 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 851
(1978); Mann, Greenstein & Eilers, Early Onset of Severe Dyskinesia Following LithiumHaloperidolTreatment, 140 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 1385 (1983) (letter to the editor); Reisberg &
Gershon, Side Effects Associated with Lithium Therapy, 36 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 879
(1979); Shukla, Lithium-CarbamazepineNeurotoxicity and Risk Factors, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1604 (1984); Shukla & Mukherjee, Lichen Simplex ChronicsDuring Lithium Treatment,
141 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 909 (1984); Spring & Frankel, New Data on Lithium and Haloperidol
Incompatibility, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 818 (1981); Zorumski & Bakris, ChoreoathetosisAssociated with Lithium: Case Report and Literature Review, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1621
(1983). However, none of these is mentioned in the course of Rivers. The decision's "side
effects footnote" cites solely to articles and cases discussing the narrower class of drugs before
the court in Rennie and Rogers. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 490 n.1, 495 N.E.2d at 339 n.1, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 76 n.1; cf Mills, 457 U.S. at 293 n.1.
284. Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 495-500, 458
N.E.2d 308, 313-15 (1983).
285. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23 ("Tjhere certainly is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions
[about internal operations of state mental institutions]."); Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface, 35 EMORY L.J. 139, 157 (1986) ("[W]hile
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Fifth, Rivers' paraphrase of the "professional judgment" language
used by the United States Supreme Court in Youngberg to support its
holding that, in the administrative process, "medical determinations as to
the need to administer antipsychotic drugs must honor the patient's due
process rights, ' 28 6 is more than mildly ironic. The Youngberg language
is now generally used to countenance more informal procedures2 8 7 and as
a standard under which "the judgment of medical authorities should de-

termine the most efficacious treatment modality that will satisfy the
treatment needs of the patient. ' 288 It is not ordinarily used as justification for a due process model which is in some ways stricter than the trial
court's original remedy in Rennie.28 9
Sixth, the decision's sole reliance on state constitutional law"9 may

be its most important legacy. Given the shift in attitude in the United
the 'right to refuse' is a fascinating issue for law and psychiatry, the problem remains
clinical."). Dr. Roth has written significantly and extensively about both the ethical and empirical issues raised by the implementation of the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Meisel,
Roth & Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrineof Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977); Roth & Appelbaum, What We Do and Do Not Know About TreatmentRefusals in Mental Institutions, in REFusING TREATMENT, supra note 234, at 179; Roth,
Competency to Decide About Treatment or Research, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 29 (1982);
Roth, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977).
286. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 495 N.E.2d at 345, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
287. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269-70; see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
288. Hermann, Barriersto ProvidingEffective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Procedural,Substantive, and DispositionalCriteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L.
REv. 83, 105 (1986). Project Release relied specifically on Youngberg's "professional judgment" language in its determination that the state regulations under attack met federal constitutional muster. ProjectRelease, 722 F.2d at 981 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
323 (1982)).
289. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1314 (independent psychiatrists shall hold informal hearings). In addition, while Rennie discarded the "least intrusive means" analysis on remand in
light of Youngberg, 720 F.2d at 269-70, see Perlin, supra note 74, at 7-8, 20 nn.134-35, Rivers
resurrects it, without any mention of the Youngberg decision. Cf.Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d
1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1187 (1985) (citing, in a "cf." reference, to
the "professional judgment" language of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982)).
Several commentators have analyzed Bee, which employed a "least restrictive alternative"
analysis in a case concerning a pretrial detainee's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Bunn,
More Meaningful Protectionfor the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 62 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 323, 340 (1985) (Bee's "refinement of the professional judgment standard clearly provides more meaningful protection for the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs"; impact of case's
protection of plaintiffs at trial still "unclear"); Note, Bee v. Greaves: PretrialDetention and
the ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs-A Missed Opportunity to ProtectFundamental Rights, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 835 (1985); Note, Bee v. Greaves: A PretrialDetainee's ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 273 (1986).
290. While the opinion cites to common-law authorities as well, it notes that these protections are "coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause of
our State Constitution." Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
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States Supreme Court on cases involving institutional reform and its concomitant emphasis on professional deference,29 1 and the general renais-

sance of state constitutional law as a source of rights in matters involving
civil liberties,2 92 the broad articulation of a state constitutional right in
Rivers may reasonably be expected to have an impact both beyond the
geographic borders of New York and beyond the subject-matter confines
of the question of the right of the institutionalized mentally disabled to
refuse treatment.
Although several other state cases have used state constitutions as
the source of finding similar rights,2 93 none appears to have the potential
scope and impact of Rivers.2 94 While it is far too early to speculate as to
Rivers' ultimate impact, it should be self-evident that it is available as a
model to high courts of other states, if they wish to "sidestep ' 29 the
Supreme Court's decisions in Mills and Youngberg and the Third Circuit's cutbacks in its Rennie remand decision.
3.

Right to treatment

Surprisingly, there has been virtually no caselaw on the question of a
state constitutional right to treatment on behalf of mentally disabled persons.2 96 While ambiguities in decisions by the highest appellate courts in
both New Jersey29 7 and New York2 98 may be so interpreted, there have
291. See supra text accompanying notes 69-99.
292. See supra notes 154-90 and accompanying text.
293. A right to refuse treatment has been found under the New Hampshire state constitution in Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 465 A.2d 484 (1983). There, in one of the
broadest readings, the New Hampshire Supreme Court looked specifically at the state constitutional provision granting "mentally ill persons, like all other individuals ....certain fundamental liberty interests" in finding that patients have "a right to be free from unjustified intrusion
upon their personal security," which includes a qualified right to refuse treatment as "a liberty
interest which is protected by our State Constitution." Id. at 559-60, 465 A.2d at 488-89; see
also Large v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399 (1986) (right to refuse treatment for
mentally ill convicts); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1984) (right to refuse treatment for incurably ill non-psychiatric patients who seek the discontinuation of artificial life support systems).
294. It is ironic that, while Rivers declared a broad right to refuse treatment on state constitutional law grounds (ignoring the contrary federal constitutional decision of Project Release),
the Rennie trial court originally rejected defendants' abstention argument, in part, because a
New Jersey state trial court had previously approved-on state law grounds-of the involuntary admininstration of psychotropic drugs to resisting patients. See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at
1142; In re Hospitalization of B., 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760 (Law Div. 1977).
295. See generally supra note 96. See also Brant, The Hostility of the Burger Court to
Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 77, 83 (1983);
Kemna, supra note 234, at 132.
296. Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
297. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 253-63, 344 A.2d 289, 299-303 (1975).
298. See, e-g., Layette M. v. Corporation Counsel, 35 N.Y.2d 136, 143, 316 N.E.2d 314,
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been no cases holding squarely that there is such a state constitutional
right.2 99
4. Rights involving sterilization
Several courts have weighed state constitutional provisions along
with their federal counterparts in cases involving petitions for involuntary sterilization of minors or incompetent persons, 300 and have found
both the right to be sterilized.3 0 and the right to autonomy in sterilization decision-making to be protected by such provisions.3 0 2
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, first recognized that,
although a right to sterilization had not received express constitutional

protection from the United States Supreme Court, several lower courts
had found such a right,30 3 and that, drawing on its historic decision in In
re Quinlan,3 4 the right to be sterilized was included in the privacy rights
afforded by the federal Constitution. 0 5 Beyond this basis, however, the
317, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20, 24 (1974) (citing, in a "cf." reference, Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33
N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973), for proposition that "failure to provide
suitable and adequate treatment [cannot] be justified by lack of staff or facilities.").
299. See, eg., In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980) (footnote omitted) ("Other
courts have consistently held a patient in a mental hospital has a constitutional right to meaningful treatment. We adopt this view and hold it is the law in the State of Oklahoma."). There
is, however, no citation to the Oklahoma state constitution, and the cases cited in the omitted
footnote are all federal constitutional decisions. See id. at n.6.
In Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, 429 So. 2d 574, 580 (Miss.
1983), while holding that the state could properly charge a patient for the reasonable costs of
his care, maintenance and treatment, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the state constitution vested in the legislature the duty to provide the mentally ill with care and treatment.
Id. at 579 (citing Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 86). Chill is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 490-93.
300. In addition to the cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 301-12, see Eberhardy
v. Circuit Court, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 548-51, 307 N.W.2d 881, 885-87 (1981) (discussing circuit
court's state constitutional right to rule on petition by guardian seeking to have adult mentally
retarded daughter sterilized). The Alaska Supreme Court has held that a trial court of general
jurisdiction had, pursuant to the state constitution, broad parenspatriaepower over incompetents, enabling it to act upon a petition seeking sterilization filed by guardian of noninstitutionalized, adult mentally disabled woman afflicted with Down's Syndrome. K.C.M. v. Alaska,
627 P.2d 607, 609-12 (Alaska 1981) (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467
(1981); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
301. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
302. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387
(1985).
303. Grady, 85 N.J. at 248-49, 426 A.2d at 474 (citing Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp.,
475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978)).
304. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (right to privacy found in state constitution);
see N.J. CONsT. art. 1, 11.
305. Grady, 85 N.J. at 249, 426 A.2d at 474. The application in the Grady case was brought
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New Jersey Supreme Court specifically found that the right was also protected by the state constitution,3 °6 and that "the governmental intrusion
into privacy rights may require more persuasive showing of a public in-

terest

under 30 7our

State Constitution

than under

the federal

Constitution.,
The California Supreme Court-in addition to finding that state leg-

islation 3 1which absolutely forbade sterilization of persons 30 9 under conservatorship deprived developmentally disabled persons of their privacy
rights under the state and federal constitutions 3 -- also found that the

right of a woman "to choose whether or not to bear a child and thus to
control her social role and personal destiny" 311 was a fundamental right
under the same state constitutional provision,
313

stricted only by a compelling state interest.

12

which could be re-

5. Other issues involving the mentally disabled
In addition, other courts have invoked state constitutional provisions in cases involving the scope of testimonial privilege which can be
invoked by a psychotherapist, 31 4 a court's authority to order a state
by the parents of a noninstitutionalized 19-year old daughter similarly afflicted with Down's
Syndrome. Id. at 240-41, 426 A.2d at 469-70.
306. Id. at 249, 426 A.2d at 474 (citing N.J. CONST. art I, 1).
307. Id.; see also In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 563-64, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (1982) (United
States Supreme Court has "implicitly recognized that the right of a person to be sterilized is a
fundamental right"; court also relies on other cases to support "right of a person to be free
from nonconsensual invasion of bodily integrity").
308. In Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 160-61, 707 P.2d 760, 771-72, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 398-99 (1985), part of the California probate code, subsequently amended, was
declared unconstitutional.
309. The Valerie N. case was brought by parents who were co-conservators of their adult
developmentally disabled daughter who, like the subjects of the petition in Grady and K. CM.,
was afflicted with Down's Syndrome. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 148, 707 P.2d at 762, 219 Cal.
Rptr. at 389-90.
310. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 160-63, 707 P.2d at 771-74, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399-401 (citing
CAL. CONST. art. I, § I).
311. Id. at 163, 707 P.2d at 774, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
312. Id.; see CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
313. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 164, 707 P.2d at 774, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (citing CAL.
CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7). But see id. at 174-91, 707 P.2d at 781-93, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408-20
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
314. See, eg., In re B., 482 Pa. 471, 484, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (1978) (patient's right to prevent psychiatrist from disclosing certain information obtained in the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship based on state constitutional right to privacy). This opinion was
characterized by petitioner's counsel as "very confused." Meisel, supra note 170, at 39 n.168;
see McKirdy v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 12, 23, 188 Cal. Rptr. 143, 150-51 (1982)
(psychotherapy patient's "proper and substantial" interest in privacy of communications with
therapist protected in part by state constitutional provision guaranteeing right to privacy outweighed by state's need to investigate alleged fraud in therapist's billing practices); see also
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mental health department to pay the cost of care for a mentally disabled
child at a private psychiatric hospital,3 1 5 limitations on the use of a group
home by the mentally retarded,31 6 the scope of remedy available to a

litigant alleging false imprisonment and false arrest in an involuntary
civil commitment proceeding,3 17 and the legality of a reimbursement

scheme by which certain relatives of institutionalized mentally disabled
persons were billed for the costs of their institutionalization. 318
D.

Conclusion

Thus, while the use of state constitutions as a source of fights for

31 9
mentally disabled individuals is a comparatively recent development,

and while caselaw is still somewhat limited, decisions such as Rivers v.
Katz make it likely that, as the Supreme Court continues to be unreceptive to far-reaching and innovative claims brought on behalf of such perWood v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 1144-48, 212 Cal. Rptr. 811, 817-20 (1985)
(same).
315. See In re Hamil, 69 Ohio St. 2d 97, 99, 431 N.E.2d 317, 318-19 (1982) (court lacked
such authority; state constitutional provision imposed duty solely on state to provide for the
handicapped in public facilities).
316. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thelen v. City of Missoula, 168 Mont. 375, 380-81, 543 P.2d 173,
176-78 (1975) (statutes providing for community residential facilities for developmentally disabled persons in all residential zones constitutional). The court in Thelen relied on a state
constitutional section providing that the legislature "shall provide such economic assistance
and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason
of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have need for the aid of society." MoNT. CONST. art.
XII, § 3(3); see also Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group,
61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984).
317. Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 300 Md. 520, 535-36, 479 A.2d 921, 930
(1984) (where individual deprived of property interest in violation of federal or state constitutional provision rights enforceable by common-law action for damages). The Widgeon court
held that state and federal constitutional provisions are to be read "in pari materia." Id. at
531, 479 A.2d at 927; cf Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986) (scope of qualified immunity
of police officer in federal damages action). See generally Friesen, Recovering Damagesfor
State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1269 (1985).
318. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194, on remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d
321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
The Supreme Court remanded the initial Kirchner opinion because that opinion lacked
clarity as to whether it struck down the statutory provision on the basis of the state or federal
constitution. 380 U.S. at 196-97. On remand, the California Supreme Court noted that, while
it had understood that the fourteenth amendment and parallel state constitutional sections
provided "generally equivalent but independent protections," it had premised its decision on
"our construction and application of California law, regardless of whether there is or is not
compulsion to the same end by the federal Constitution." 62 Cal. 2d at 588, 400 P.2d at 322,
43 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
319, But see supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
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sons, the use of state constitutions as a source of rights will increase
significantly in the coming years.
III.
A.

STATE STATUTES

Introduction

In addition to state constitutional provisions, state statutory provisions are being turned to more frequently as sources of rights for the
mentally disabled. While a small body of literature has developed with
regard to the use of state constitutions generally,3 2 ° the law reviews have
been nearly silent 32 1 on the equally important question of the applicability and utility of state statutory bills of rights to the pertinent substantive
and procedural issues.
B.

HistoricalBackground

Although several states enacted modest statutes protecting the sub-

stantive fights of the institutionalized mentally disabled as early as the
1930's and 1940's,322 it was not until the publication of the Council on
State Government's national report3 23 and the issuance of the National
Institute of Mental Health's Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill (Draft Act)324 in the early 1950's that state legislatures be-

320. See, eg., Meisel, supra note 170; Schwartz, supra note 203.
321. The major exception has been the work of Professors Martin Levine, Martha LyonLevine and Jack Zusman. See Lyon, Levine & Zusman, Patients'Bills of Rights: A Survey of
State Statutes, 6 MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 178 (1982) [hereinafter Survey I]; Lyon-Levine, Levine & Zusman, Developments in Patients' Bills of Rights Since the Mental Health
Systems Act, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 146 (1985) [hereinafter Survey If];
Levine & Lyon-Levine, Is Mental Health Rights Protection a Dead Horse? Legislative
Processes, Bills of Rights and Advocacy (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (to be published in
NEB. L. REV.).
322. In Massachusetts, statutory enactments providing the institutionalized mentally disabled with limited rights to visitation by counsel and correspondence with institutional officials
date to the 19th century. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 195, § 4 (1879) (visitation); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 363, §§ 1-2 (1874) (correspondence). These sections remained virtually unchanged-see,
e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 123, §§ 97-98 (Law. Co-op 1949); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
123, §§ 97-98 (West 1969)-until the 1970 recodification of the Massachusetts mental health
code. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West 1986); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 '/2,
9-14 (Smith-Hurd 1951) (providing for institutional investigation if patient is being "cruelly,
negligently or improperly treated") (repealed); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 330.62 (1948) (right of
state hospital commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations so that hospital patients receive "proper care, attention and treatment"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7711 (1968) (attorney
visitation).
323. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS OF THE
FORTY-EIGHT STATES (1950) [hereinafter CSG].
324. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1952) [hereinafter DRAFT ACT]. For commentaries discuss-
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gan to consider-for the first time-the implications of the notion that
individuals' civil rights could not be abrogated simply because of

institutionalization.325
Although the suggestion that patients could retain "all their personal rights" was still labeled as "foolhardy, ' 3 26 there was at least some
sense327 that a "practical ideal for the care and treatment of mental pa' 329
tients"32 would include the right to "humane care and treatment

all
and, subject to certain significant limitations,330 the right to "exercise 332

civil rights.

331

Under the Draft Act, patients were also to be entitled

"to communicate by sealed mail or otherwise with persons, including official agencies, inside or outside the hospital ' 333 and to "receive visitors. ' 334 The commentary to the Draft Act noted that these sections

were stated "as broadly as it is possible
to do so consistently with the
335
orderly execution of the hospital.

ing the Draft Act, see Beaver, The "Mentally Ill" and the Law: Sisyphus and Zeus, 1968
UTAH L. REV.1; Taylor, A CriticalLook Into the Involuntary Civil Commitment Procedure, 10
WASHBURN W. 237 (1971).
325. See generally THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 142-82 (F. Lindman & D.
McIntyre eds. 1961) [hereinafter Lindman].
326. Id. at 142.
327. See generally DRAFT ACT, supra note 324. In summarizing the developments in this
area in the American Bar Foundation's Report on the Rights of the Mentally Ill, Lindman and
McIntyre reflected significant ambiguity:
The extent to which restrictions should be placed on the rights and freedoms of
mental patients, whether voluntary or involuntary, poses a real dilemma. Some restrictions are, no doubt, necessary to further the patient's treatment and welfare.
The doctors in charge are in the best position to make this determination. As statutory law now stands, generally speaking, hospital authorities have broad discretion in
dealing with the rights of patients but lack official criteria to guide them. The majority of the states are without statutory provisions guaranteeing protection of patients'
rights in the area of correspondence and visitation, mechanical restraints, major medical treatment, [and] employment .... This is an undesirable state of affairs from
every point of view.
Lindman, supra note 325, at 155.
328. See DRAFr ACT, supra note 324, § 19 comment.
329. Id. § 19.
330. The exercise of civil rights was to be subject to "the general rules and regulations of the
hospital" and "the extent that the head of the hospital determines that it is necessary for the
medical welfare of the patient to impose restrictions." Id. § 21(a)(3).
331. Id. These civil rights were to include "the right to dispose of property, execute instruments, make purchases, enter contractual relationships, and vote unless [the patient had] been
adjudicated incompetent and not restored to legal capacity." Id. This right, according to the
Act's commentary, "follows naturally from the fact that, under the theory of the Act, a determination that hospitalization is justified is entirely different and separate from an adjudication
of incompetency." Id § 21(a)(3) comment.
332. See supra note 330 for applicable limitations.
333. DRAFr ACT, supra note 324, § 21(a)(1).
334. Id. § 21(a)(2).
335. Id. § 21(a) comment.
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In addition, the Draft Act and the State Government Council report

also suggested regulation of the imposition of mechanical restraints on
the institutionalized3 36 and the compulsory "employment" of patients
without compensation.3 3 7 Contemporaneous studies prepared by the

Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry recommended safeguards
against the indiscriminate use of such intrusive interventions as psycho339
surgery 338 and electroshock treatment.
In response to these initiatives and to other governmental, professional and blue-ribbon studies questioning patient treatment at large pub-

lic institutions, 34° states began to enact laws providing some "baseline"
protections in the areas discussed. By 1958, nine states adopted the
Draft Act's language 34 1 as to the exercise of civil rights, communication
and visitation, 342 and eight provided patients with the right to un343
restricted correspondence with attorneys.

Although commentators were especially critical of the overuse and
misuse of mechanical restraints, as of 1961, only a dozen states attempted

to provide any sort of regulation of the practice. 3 " At the same time, it
did not appear as if any state law adequately protected patients against

exploitation and abuse in the area of forced labor.3 45 Finally, only six
states made any provision for the regulation of major medical treatment, 34 6 and, of these, only the Kansas law347 could be construed-by

the most expansive and charitable reading-to be protective of patients'
336. CSG, supra note 323, at 12, 192-94; DRAFT ACT,supra note 324, § 20.
337. CSG, supra note 323, at 187.
338. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, RESEARCH ON PREFRONTAL LoBOTOMY (1948).
339. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF'PSYCHIATRY, SHOCK THERAPY (1947).

340. See Lindman, supra note 325, at 142-55 & nn.17-18, 26-27, 29, 32-33, 37-40.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 331-33.
342. Lindman, supra note 325, at 145 n.23. The states were Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and Utah. See id. at 158-59 table VA. In addition, 11 other states adopted some sort of statute governing visitation alone. Id. at
145, 158-59 table V-A.
343. Id. at 143 nn.11-12. While Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Lousiana, Pennsylvania,
Texas and Wisconsin enacted statutes, New York promulgated its policy in an administrative
regulation, apparently in response to earlier litigation. See id. at 143 (discussing Hoff v. State,
279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671 (1939), and People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing, 167 Misc. 702, 4
N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. Ct. 1938)).
344. Id. at 146; see also id. at 163 table V-B (Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah).
345. See id. at 151-52. Although several states governed nontherapeutic labor by patients,
none provided appropriate statutory safeguards. See, e.g., id. at 151 nn.79-80.
346. Id. at 165 table V-C (Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Vermont).
347. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-1239 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1965).
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348

In short, prior to the "due process revolution, '34 9 few states regulated the substantive treatment of the institutionalized mentally disabled.

It was not until the district court's decision in Wyatt v. Stickney35 that
state legislatures began to respond seriously to the issues raised and articulated in the State Government report and the Draft Act.
C. Impact of Wyatt
There can be no doubt concerning the significance of Wyatt v.
Stickney3 5 I as an "influential force ' 35 2 in the shaping of modem statelevel patients' bills of rights and bills of rights on behalf of the developmentally disabled. The elaborate standards 35 3 crafted in Wyatt-ranging
from the global to the ultra-specific, and covering virtually every phase of

institutional patient 1ife354---served as the role model for many of the approximately fifteen states 35 5 that either adopted new legislation
or ex3 56
panded existing statutes in the immediate aftermath of Wyatt.
These statutes 357-to either a greater or lesser degree-began to
348. While exempting public hospital employees from liability to patients for any physical
or mental injury caused by the use of shock treatment, the statute premised immunity on the
proviso that "approved and accepted methods and techniques of administering such 'shock'
treatment are [to be] used." Id.
349. See supra note 10.
350. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (later opinion), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (later opinion), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(later proceeding), aff'd in partand remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
351. Id.
352. See The Wyatt Standards: An Influential Force in State and FederalRules, 28 Hosp.
& COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 374 (1977) [hereinafter Influential Force]. According to Louis
Kopolow, M.D., coordinator of patients' rights and advocacy programs for the National Institute of Mental Health, however, Wyatt served more as a "'moralizing force'" than as a "specific cause" of the new legislation. Id.
353. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 387, 395-408 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
354. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 74, at 2.
355. See Influential Force, supra note 352. States which enacted such legislation between
the issuance of the Wyatt orders in 1972 and the promulgation of the report of the Task Force
on Legal and Ethical Issues of the President's Commission on Mental Health in 1978, included
Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin. Id. See generally Survey I,
supra note 321.
356. For helpful tabular overviews, see E. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 339-58
(1984); B. SALES, DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAw 849-64 (1982); Survey I,supra note 321,
at 185-200; State Survey: Rights ofDisabledPersons in Residential Facilities,3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 348 (1979) [hereinafter State Survey].
357. Several patients' bills of rights were enacted between the time of the Wyatt decision
and the publication of the report of the Task Force on Legal and Ethical Issues of the Presi-
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track 358 Wyatt and guarantee 31 9 patients the right to "appropriate treatment and services, ' 36 0 to an individualized treatment plan 361 which is to

be periodically reviewed, 362 to an aftercare plan, 363 to a humane treatdent's Commission on Mental Health. See infra notes 397-422 and accompnaying text; see also
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-1-1 to -32 (Burns 1983 & Supp.
1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-25-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-10-101 to 126 (1977).
Recent codifications of state patients' bills of rights include the following: ALASKA STAT.
§§ 47.30.825 to .865 (1984 & Supp. 1986); ARiz. REV.STAT. ANN. §§ 36-504 to -517 (1986);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1416 (Supp. 1985); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5331 (West
1984 & Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10-101 to -129 (1982 & Supp. 1985); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-206a to -206k (West 1975 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5161 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-561 to -565 (1981 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.459 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-140 to -168 (Harrison 1982); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 2-100 to -202 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-141.6-1 to -11 (Burns 1983 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.23 (West 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-2927 to -2930 (1983); KY.REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.191 (Baldwin 1982); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:171 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3803 (Supp.
1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to -713 (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123, §§ 23-25 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.800(700)-(754) (Callaghan 1980 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-102 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 630.110 to .200 (Vernon 1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-142 to -162 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433.464 to .494 (1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B:42 to :48 (1978 & Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-24.1 to
.2 (West 1981); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 33.01 to .17 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1986);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1-40 to -42 (1978 & Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5122.01 to .301 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 91 to 93
(West 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.380 to .395 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7116
(Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-5 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-23-1010 to
-1090 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 27A-12-1 to -33 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-3-104 to -111 (1984 & Supp. 1986); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80 to
-87 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 to -48 (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 7701-7711 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.360 to .370 (1975); W.
VA. CODE § 27-5-9 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61 (West Supp. 1986).
In addition, other states have adopted bills of rights for the developmentally disabled
which generally track the federal Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (Supp. III 1985); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36551.01; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-101 to -131 (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5501-5507; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1.6-1 to -11 (Burns 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
34-B, §§ 5601-5608; MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-601 to -614 (1982 & Supp. 1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171-A:1 to 17 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:6D-1 to -12 (West 1981).
358. By 1982, virtually all states had some sort of patients' rights legislation in place, but in
many cases actual protection was little more than "nominal." Survey I, supra note 321, at 179.
359. For a listing of various enforcement mechanisms, see State Survey, supra note 356. In
New Jersey, for instance, any individual subject to institutionalization in a facility for the
mentally disabled shall be "entitled to enforce any of the rights [enumerated in the Patients'
Bill of Rights, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-24.1 to 24.2] by civil action or other remedies otherwise available by common law or statute." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2h.
360. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.655(2), (3) (1984).
361. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(2)(e).
362. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206(f) (West 1975).
363. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-162(3).
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ment environment, 364 and to privacy 65 and safety."' Similarly, other
statutory provisions mandated a right to refuse treatment 367 and to such
communications rights3 68 as the right to converse privately, 369 to have
visitors, 7 0 and to communicate by telephone37 1 and mail.37 2
In addition, certain jurisdictions provided patients with the right to
an explanation regarding their treatment, 373 and with certain rights re-

garding the records of their institutionalization and notice of their substantive treatment rights while hospitalized: confidentiality of records, 7 4
access to one's own records 375 (both before and after discharge), 376 and
information as to one's rights (both orally 37 7 and through posted
notices).378
Also, statutes were amended and rewritten to provide patients with
a mechanism through which they could assert grievances 379 through
some sort of administrative structure38 0 and with access by a legal representative 381 or to a patient advocate.3 81 Other laws specified that there
could be no reprisals against patients for asserting their rights, 3 3 and
that patients were entitled to a whole range of civil rights while institutionalized,38 4 including the right to free practice of religion,38 5 to be com364. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-6(D) (1978).
365. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.29(G) (Anderson 1981).
366. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.110.1(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
367. See, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(a)(6), (b). An earlier statutory survey on this
specific right can be found in Plotkin, supra note 234, at 504-25.
368. See generally, Perlin, Other Rights of Residents in Institutions, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS,
supra note 31, at 1009.
369. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:171(c) (West 1978).
370. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 2-103.
371. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.23(3) (West 1985) (as amended).
372. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 93.
373. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West 1984).
374. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459(9).
375. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10-120(1)(b) (1982).
376. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.31 (Anderson 1981).
377. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-3-111 (Supp. 1986).
378. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-48(5) (1986).
379. See supra note 358.
380. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(5)(a).
381. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.110(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
382. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1030. This statute, and others like it, see Survey I,
supra note 321, at 194-96, provide only that a patient has a right to communicate with "his
counsel." See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-33-310 to -400 (establishing the South Carolina
Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped, Inc.); id. § 43-33-350(1) (system shall
protect and advocate for the rights of developmentally disabled persons by "pursuing legal...
remedies to insure the protection of the rights of such persons").
383. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.840(a)(11) (1984).
384. See, eg., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.01 (McKinney 1978).
385. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 426.385(1)(d).
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pensated for work done,3 86 to not be barred from registering to vote
because of institutional status,38 7 to physical exercise and outdoor recreation, 3 88 to a nourishing diet, 38 9 and to reasonable visitation from members of the opposite sex.3 90
It must be stressed that these statutes were neither all-encompassing
nor uniform. As recently as 1982, only five states were found to be in
substantial compliance with the bills of rights recommendations of the
Task Force on Legal and Ethical Issues of the President's Commission
on Mental Health.3 9 1 Also, the assumption made by several senators
during the debate on the federal Mental Health Systems Act 39 2 -that
thirty-five states had adequately comprehensive bills of rights protections 39 3-- was flatly erroneous. 394 On the other hand, while this figure
was clearly "inflated, 3 95 the statutes referred to 39 6 reveal that-to some
extent, at least-state legislatures were beginning to respond to the moral
imperative of cases such as Wyatt.
D.

Impact of the President'sCommission's Report

When the Task Force on Legal and Ethical Issues of the President's
Commission on Mental Health submitted its final report in 1978, it
stressed the importance of state-level patients' bills of rights as a major
tool "to help to ensure 'equal access to justice' for mentally handicapped
persons., 397 Invoking Judge Frank Johnson's "seminal" decision in Wyatt v. Stickney,3 98 it lauded those states which had at that time codified
"the outlines of a constitutional right to protection of bodily integrity
386. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1066(7) (1981).

387. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.29(a).
388. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-40(8) (1978).
389. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115.1(13).
390. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(a)(3).
391. See generallysupra note 321.
392. 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (1983); see infra notes 397-422 and accompanying text.
393. Survey I, supra note 321, at 178.
394. Id. at 179-80.
395. Id. at 180.
396. See id. at 185-201.
397. See Mental Health andHuman Rights: Report of the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical
Issues, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 49 (1978) [hereinafter Mental Health and Human Rights].
For an analysis of the Commission's work while in progress, see Special Report: The
President's Commission on Mental Health: Assessing the Needs of the Nation, 28 HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 677 (1977).

398. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (later opinion), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (later opinion), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(later proceding), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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from unwanted State intrusion., 399
The need for such legislation, the Task Force noted, "should be selfevident": ° "The extent of discrimination against mentally handicapped
persons needs no lengthy recitation. The pattern of abuse, disenfranchisement, and disregard eloquently underscores the need for vigorous, enforceable, prophylactic legislation in each of the States.'"" Such
legislation would not "consign[ ] the mentally handicapped to secondclass citizen status," but would acknowledge the fact that "such persons
have been perceived and treated as second-class citizens-or worse-by
much of society."'" 2
The Task Force considered the array of pre-existing state statutes, 4°3
and recommended that each state adopt legislation which would include
at least seven basic components:
(a) A statement that all mentally handicapped persons are
entitled to the specified rights;
(b) A statement that rights cannot be abridged solely because of a person's handicap or because s/he is being treated
(whether voluntarily or involuntarily);
(c) A declaration of the right to treatment, the right to
refuse treatment and the regulation of treatment, the right to
privacy and dignity, the right to a humane physical and psychological environment and the right to the least restrictive alternative setting for treatment;
(d) A statement of other, enumerated fundamental rights
which may not be abridged or limited;
(e) A statement of other, specified rights which may be
altered or limited only under specific, limited circumstances;
(f) An enforcement provision; and
(g) A statement that handicapped persons retain the right
to enforce their rights through habeascorpus and all other common law or statutory remedies.'
The President's Commission generally endorsed its Task Panel's
399. Mental Health and Human Rights, supra note 397, at 133-34 (quoting, in part, Developments-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1345 (1974)).
400. Mental Health and Human Rights, supra note 397, at 134.
401. Mental Health and Human Rights, supra note 397, at 134.
402. Mental Health and Human Rights, supra note 397, at 134; see also Wald, Basic Personal & Civil Rights, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CMZEN AND THE LAW 3, 18 (M. Kindred ed. 1976) (handicapped person perceived as "someone to whom attention need not be
paid.").
403. See, e.g., Mental Health and Human Rights, supra note 397, at 134 n.197.
404. Mental Health and Human Rights, supra note 397, at 134.
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suggestions stating that, as there were "strong legal, ethical, and social
policy reasons for adopting the principles of a right to receive treatment,

a right to receive treatment in the least restrictive setting, and a right to
refuse treatment,""4

it recommended that "[e]ach State review its

mental health laws and revise them, if necessary, to ensure that they provide for" such rights," 6 along with "a right to due process when community placement is being considered."'" 7

"To articulate these.., rights," the Commission recommended that
"[e]ach State have a 'Bill of Rights' for all mentally disabled persons,

wherever they reside.""

8

It added that such a bill should include the

same seven components that the Task Force had listed earlier.40 9

The bill that was ultimately enacted by Congress-the Mental
Health Systems Act of 1980 (MHSA)g°---included a bill of rights that
was merely a recommendation rather than an enforceable enactment of

rights.411 A survey done soon after enactment showed that, contrary to
Congress' belief that at least thirty-five states already had enacted comprehensive protective statutes,4 12 only five states had actually complied
with as many as half of the Act's recommendations, 4 13 while just twentytwo substantially complied with one-third.4 14 Significantly, the greatest
degree of compliance was found in areas not directly related to treat-

ment, e.g., visitation (forty-two states) and confidentiality of records
(forty-six states),415 while the right to a humane treatment environment
and the least restrictive alternative for treatment each were clearly stipu405. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 43
(1978).
406. Id. at 44. The Commission added one caveat. In recommending the inclusion of a

statutory section providing for a right to refuse treatment, it added language specifying that
states pay "careful attention to the circumstances and procedures under which the right may
be qualified." Ia.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 72 n.45.
410. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9401-9522 (1983).
411. See 42 U.S.C. § 9501 which provides:
It is the sense of the Congress that each State should review and revise, if necessary, its laws to ensure that mental health patients receive the protection and services
they require; and in making such review and revision should take into account the
recommendations of the President's Commission on Mental Health and: [42 U.S.C.
§ 9501(1)-(4)(c)].
42 U.S.C. § 9501. See generally,Survey I, supra note 321, at 178; see also Survey II, supra note
321.
412. Survey I, supra note 321, at 178; see Survey II, supra note 321, at 153 n.4 (citing remarks by Senators Morgan, Hatch, Danforth, Javits and Roth).

413. Survey I, supra note 321, at 179 (Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana and New York).
414. Id.
415. Id.

June 1987]

DISABILITY RIGHTS SYMPOSIUM

1305

lated in only nineteen states.4 16
In the five years after the MHSA was passed, thirteen states made at
least some substantive amendments to their patients' rights acts so as to
provide some of the protections recommended in the federal act.4 17 Of
these states, only one, Hawaii, made such changes which provided patients with "virtually all the rights recommended in the MHSA." '1 8 Interestingly, of all the states where changes were made, only in Hawaii did
officials indicate that the passage of the MHSA substantially influenced
the new laws.4 19 According to that state's Mental Health Association,
the legislative revision was based "entirely" on the MHSA, which served
as a "catalyst" to initiate statutory review.4 20
Notwithstanding this lack of direct causation, the commentators
who have studied this issue most closely have concluded that MHSA's
Bill of Rights was nevertheless important "as a step in legitimatizing the

very idea of rights for those who receive mental health services."421 They
note that the Act's content "may have had influence on practice, legal

advice, regulations
or court decisions, even if it was not incorporated in
422
state statutes.,
416. Id.
417. Survey II, supra note 321, at 147. In at least one state (Illinois), statutory review was
abandonedbecause of the advisory-only language in the Mental Health Systems Act (MHSA).
Id.
418. Id.; see also id. at 151 (discussing post-1980 changes in the state laws of Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland and Mississippi, the only states felt to have made "extensive changes" in the
interim five years).
419. Id. at 147. Officials in at least four states-Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts and
Utah-indicated that court decisions were the key factor spurring legislative change. Id.
420. Id. (emphasis in original).
421. Id. at 153. For a more pessimistic reading, see FederalBill ofRights Has Little Impact
on the States, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1008 (1985).
422. Survey II, supra note 321, at 153. The Act itself has not been cited extensively. See
Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10 n.2, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 90 n.2 (1983) ("Congress has
also declared that all state mental health programs should provide treatment in the least restrictive environment" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9501(1)(A),(F),(G),(J))); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d
836, 852 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982) (comparing § 9501 to
New Jersey's Administrative Bulletin 78-3, and concluding that New Jersey has "anticipated
and accommodated virtually all of the concerns expressed in the [MHSA]").
In their comprehensive analysis of the creation of the MHSA, Professors Levine and
Lyon-Levine conclude:
If the states do not guarantee the rights specified in the MHSA, as Congress has
said it expects, we can see what will happen when the political pendulum predictably
swings back some day to a more activist Congress. The MHSA rights, along with
those of Pennhurst, will no doubt return to the Congressional agenda for effective
enforcement ....
In order for rights protection to remain a strong contender, its proponents must
learn the lessons of this history. If they do, rights protection for consumers of mental
health services-bills of rights and advocacy-is no dead horse.
Levine & Lyon-Levine, supra note 321, at 58.
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E. Substantive Patients'Rights Under State Statutes

Litigation42 3 under state-level patients' bills of rights 42 4 has focused
predominantly on the same substantive rights which have been at the
center of the major constitutional litigation which has developed over the
past decade: the right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, institutional rights and the right to deinstitutionalization and/or community
services.
Although some courts4 2 5 have appeared reluctant to construe such
statutes more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has
read the Constitution in such cases as Youngberg v. Romeo42 6 and Mills
v. Rogers,4 2 7 others have explicitly articulated a broader reading of state
law. 28 While no clear trends emerge from these conflicting modes of
interpretation, it is clear that, in some states at least, the Supreme Court's

modest statements of the breadth of the right to treatment 429 and the
right to refuse treatment43 ° will not bar innovative and wide-ranging
state statutory decisions.
1. The right to treatment
a. before Youngberg

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg, several courts
read relevant state statutes to create enforceable rights to treatment and
431

to provide habilitation for the institutionalized mentally disabled.

423. Courts in nearly every state have, of course, construed their commitment laws to determine the appropriate procedural and substantive due process safeguards applicable in the
civil commitment process. These issues are generally beyond the scope of this Article. See
e.g., In re Hop, 29 Cal. 3d 82, 623 P.2d 282, 171 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1981) (applying right to jury
trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard and appointment of counsel to case of developmentally disabled person institutionalized at state hospital); North Dakota State Hosp. v.
Palmer, 363 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1985) (determining adequacy of outpatient treatment); cf Association of Bds. of Visitors v. Prevost, 98 A.D.2d 260, 471 N.Y.S.2d 342 (App. Div. 1983)
(Boards of Visitors of state facilities for the mentally disabled lacked, under state law, standing
to sue to compel state watchdog agency to provide counsel to investigate complaints of patient
abuse at state hospital).
424. See supra notes 320-422 and accompanying text.
425. See Dixon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thompson, 91111. 2d 518, 440 N.E.2d 117
(1982); see also County of San Diego v. Fadley, 159 Cal. App. 3d 440, 441-47, 205 Cal. Rptr.
572, 573-76 (1984).
426. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
427. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
428. See infra notes 473-585 and accompanying text.
429. See Perlin, supra note 74, at 5.
430. See id. at 6-7.
431. See, e.g., Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Chasse v. Banns, 119
N.H. 93, 399 A.2d 608 (1979); New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Human Servs., 89 N.J. 234, 445 A.2d 704 (1982); E.H. v. Matin, 168 W. Va. 248, 284
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Thus, in E.H. v. Matin,4 32 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals interpreted that state's bill of rights43 3 as the legislature's
"acknowledg[ment ofi its concern for both humane conditions of custody
and effective therapeutic treatment" in "conformity with the highest possible standards of moral rectitude";43 4 in enforcing this right, the court
was not being asked to "impose a new constitutional standard upon a
reluctant and unwilling state [but] rather, ... only to order the executive
branch to fulfill its obligation under clear and unambiguous statutory
provisions."4'35
The legislature, the court reasoned, could not have passed the pertinent provisions of the mental health code "for any reason other than to

establish rights in mental patients" and a corresponding duty upon the
state.43 6 If patients could not seek enforcement of these rights in the
courts, "both right and duty evaporate in any meaningful sense and the
43 7
entire Code provision becomes either a joke or an exercise in irony.

The court could not "infer that either was the intent of our
Legislature."4 3 8
S.E.2d 232 (1981). But see United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1063 (1977); Santori v. Fong, 484 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
432. 168 W. Va. 248, 284 S.E.2d 232 (1981).
433. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9 (1986).
434. E.H., 168 W. Va. at 257, 284 S.E.2d at 237.
435. Id. (emphasis added). The statute in question reads, in pertinent part:
(b) Each patient of a mental health facility receiving services therefrom shall
receive care and treatment that is suited to his needs and administered in a skillful,
safe and humane manner with full respect for his dignity and personal integrity.
(c) Every patient shall have the following rights regardless of adjudication of
incompetency:
(1) Treatment by trained personnel;
(2) Careful and periodic psychiatric reevaluation no less frequently than
once every three months;
(3) Periodic physical examination by a physician no less frequently than
once every six months; and
(4) Treatment based on appropriate examination and diagnosis by a staff
member operating within the scope of his professional license.
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(b)-(c).
The court characterized the trial record as reflecting the " 'Dickensian squalor of unconscionable magnitudes,'" finding that patients received "woefully inadequate treatment and
that the conditions of their hospitalization are such as to shock the conscience of any civilized
society solicitous of the welfare of its unfortunate and disadvantaged members." E.H., 168 W.
Va. at 249, 284 S.E.2d at 232-33, 236 (quoting State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417,
432, 202 S.E.2d 109, 120 (1974)). In addition, the court made special reference to the
"Kafkaesque lack of [stafi] coordination." Id. at 255, 284 S.E.2d at 236. The court saw the
facts before it as "symbols of a pervasive, systemic inadequacy of our mental health hospitals
the entire length and breadth of West Virginia." Id. at 258, 284 S.E.2d at 237.
436. E.H., 168 W. Va. at 261, 284 S.E.2d at 239.
437. Id.
438. Id.
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Against this backdrop, the court enumerated its specific holdings:
(1) [The state statutory provision] creates specific enforceable rights in the entire inmate population of the State's mental
hospitals. (2) [The state statutory provision] requires a system
of custody and treatment which will reflect the competent application of current, available scientific knowledge. Where

there is a good faith difference of opinion among equally competent professional experts concerning appropriate methods of

treatment and custody, such differences should be resolved by
the director of the... Department of Health and not by the

courts. (3) It is the obligation of the State to provide the resources necessary to accord inmates of mental institutions the
rights which the State has granted them under [the state
statute].

439

The case had been brought as a mandamus action pursuant to the state
supreme court's powers of original jurisdiction.' 4 The E.H. court transferred the action to a county circuit court for purposes of developing an
appropriate remedy. 441
Similarly, in Chasse v. Banas,4 2 the New Hampshire Supreme

Court viewed the state legislature's enactment of a patient's bill of
rights"' as having created a right for involuntarily committed patients
"and concomitantly impose[d] a duty upon employees of the State hospital to provide adequate and humane treatment." 4' By enacting the law,

439. Id. at 259-60, 284 S.E.2d at 238. On the question of the financial implications of its
decision, the court responded that the "definitive answer" was provided in Wyatt v. Aderholt:
"It goes without saying that state legislatures are ordinarily free to choose
among various social services competing for legislative attention and state funds. But
that does not mean that a state legislature is free, for budgetary or any other reasons,
to provide a social service in a manner which will result in the denial of individuals'
constitutional rights. And it is the essence of our holding that the provision of treatment to those the state has involuntarily confined in mental hospitals is necessary to
make the state's actions in confining and continuing to confine those individuals constitutional. That being the case, the state may not fail to provide treatment for budgetary reasons alone."
E.H., 168 W. Va. at 260 n.2, 284 S.E.2d at 238 n.2 (quoting Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305,
1314-15 (5th Cir. 1974)). Although the E.H. court did not reach the issue of whether an
involuntarily confined patient had a right to treatment, it noted that "a growing number of
courts have... recognized such a right." Id.
440. See W. VA. CODE § 53-1-1 (1981).
441. E.H., 168 W. Va. at 259, 284 S.E.2d at 238. The court additionally ordered that defendants submit a plan to the circuit court through which the statutory rights in question "will
be accorded to every patient in mental health institutions maintained by the State of West
Virginia." Id. at 261, 284 S.E.2d at 239.
442. 119 N.H. 93, 399 A.2d 608 (1979).
443. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:43 (1973) (repealed 1986).
444. Chasse, 119 N.H. at 96, 399 A.2d at 610. "'The existence of a statutory right implies
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the court reasoned, "the legislature ha[d] done more than enunciate general objectives and goals" in "recogniz[ing] civil rights of the mentally

disabled who are confined in State institutions.""

If a patient were de-

nied the right to legal action to enforce the created rights, "the legislature's guarantee of adequate treatment [would] be an empty promise."446
Elsewhere, in Rone v. Fireman,' 7 a federal district court declined to
apply federal constitutional standards in an institutional conditions case,
finding that an Ohio state statute" 8 created judicially enforceable
rights" 9 against which the record would be measured.4 50 The court

found that the state law set forth "detailed and extensive treatment requirements," 45 ' and that its role was to "further define and determine

adequate treatment by interpreting the applicable [state] statute.

45 2

the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969)).
445. Id. at 96, 399 A.2d at 610.
446. Id. at 97, 399 A.2d at 610. Subsequently, in State v. Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 470 A.2d
869 (1983), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the state legislature, by enacting
statutes providing mentally disabled institutionalized persons with the right to adequate treatment, waived any claim of sovereign immunity in a state court damages action, but did not
waive its eleventh amendment immunity in federal court. Id. at 191-92, 470 A.2d at 873-74.
See generally Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). See also
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (eleventh amendment prohibits private
individual from suing state for damages in federal court for alleged violations of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973) (legislatively overruled by the 1986 Rehabilitation Act amendments); supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
447. 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
448. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (Baldwin 1971). In pertinent part, the statute in
question reads:
The head of the hospital ...shall assure that all patients.., shall:

(B) Have a written treatment plan consistent with the evaluation, diagnosis,
prognosis, and goals... ;
(C) Receive treatment consistent with the treatment plan. The department
of mental health shall set standards for treatment provided to such patients,
consistent wherever possible with standards set by the joint commission on accreditation of hospitals;
(D) Receive periodic reevaluations of the treatment plan by the professional staff of the hospital at intervals not to exceed ninety days;
(E) Be provided with adequate medical treatment for physical disease or
injury;
(F) Receive humane care and treatment, including without limitation, the
following:
(3) A humane psychological and physical environment within the hospital facilities ....
Id.
449.
450.
451.
452.

But see Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
Rone, 473 F. Supp. at 119-20.
Id. at 120.
Id.
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The court then analyzed "seven basic treatment rights" 453 contained

in the state law, and found, inter alia, that the defendants had failed to
develop adequate and individualized treatment programs.45 4 The court

determined that in one specific hospital unit, 4s5 the defendants failed to
maintain a "humane and therapeutic environment," 4 6 and that the hos-

pital staff was not "sufficiently qualified nor provided sufficient training
and education to provide minimally adequate humane care and treatment."4'5 7 To remedy these violations, the court entered a broad reme-

dial order "to assure all patients
at [the state hospital] the treatment
'458
required by the law of Ohio.

Finally, in New Jersey Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. New
Jersey Departmentof Human Services,45 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court

broadly interpreted a state statute providing the right of habilitation to
developmentally disabled persons." 0 The court ruled that the state was

required to provide
each resident of a state school for the retarded with
' 4 61
"specialized

and "comprehensive ... services, '4 62 including "treatment, education, training, rehabilitation, care and protection ' 463 in order

to "alleviate the residents' disabilities and promote their social, personal,
physical and economic habilitation.""'

4

The court specifically rejected

defendants' argument that the law merely obligated them to make certain
services generally available at a facility "without imposing a duty on
them to provide each individual resident with these services. ' 465 The
court responded:

We conclude that the Legislature did not merely intend
these services to be generally available at the facility. The import of these statutes is clear. [The state school] does not have
453. Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 122.
457. Id. at 123.
458. Id. at 133. See generally id. at 133-35.
459. 89 N.J. 234, 445 A.2d 704 (1982).
460. Id. at 247-50,445 A.2d at 710-12; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:6D-1 to -12 (West 1981
& Supp. 1986).
461. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-2 to 30:60-3b (West 1981).
462. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.1.
463. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.2 (2).
464. Retarded Citizens, Ina, 89 N.J. at 248, 445 A.2d at 711 (paraphrasing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:6D-3(b), 6D-9 (West 1977) (amended 1981)).
The court noted that, due to the presence of adequate state statutory grounds, it was not
necessary to reach plaintiffs' federal statutory or constitutional claims. Id. at 244 n.5, 445
A.2d at 708 n.5.
465. Id. at 247, 445 A.2d at 710.
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the freedom to choose which of its residents will receive serv-

ices and which will not. Every individual at [the state school] is
entitled to these special services not only because it is morally

right and just, although it is both those things. They are entitled to them because it is the law.4 66
On the other hand, in at least two cases, state statutory grants have
been construed narrowly. In United States v. Ecker,4 67 the Court of Ap4 68
peals for the District of Columbia interpreted the District's local law
to allow a facility to withhold certain forms of treatment if its benefits are
outweighed by the potential harm to others.4 69 A Pennsylvania district
court, in Santori v. Fong,47 0 read that state's pertinent statutes471 as "a
mere statement of policy, [which,] without more, will not rise to the level
of a constitutionally protected interest in property or liberty, because
neither an affirmative duty nor a specific right is created."4 7 2
b. since Youngberg
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court found that involuntarily confined

mentally retarded persons were entitled under the fourteenth amendment's liberty clause to such "minimally adequate or reasonable training
to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." 73 In balancing liberty interests against relevant state interests, courts must determine
466. Id. at 249, 445 A.2d at 711. An Indiana court found a right to treatment under the
federal DD Act. The court cited the counterpart state statute and noted that "both our federal
and state legislatures have entrusted our courts with the responsibility of enforcing the rights
of the developmentally disabled by requiring a judicial determination of whether a statutory
minimum level of treatment is being afforded." In re Ackerman, 409 N.E.2d 1211, 1221-22
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980); cf Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
See supra text accompanying notes 87-92 for a discussion of this case.
467. 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
468. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981) (governing treatment of persons found not
guilty by reason of insanity); cf Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
469. Ecker, 543 F.2d at 199-200; see also Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1155 n.21 (3d
Cir. 1982) (construing District of Columbia law).
470. 484 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
471. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7116 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Under the Pennsylvania statute, "[ilt is the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to seek to assure the
availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill,... and in every case, the
least restrictions consistent with adequate treatment shall be employed." Id. § 7102. The statute defines adequate treatment as "a course of treatment designed and administered to alleviate
a person's pain and distress and to maximize the probability of his recovery from mental illness." Id. § 7104.
472. Santori,484 F. Supp. at 1031; see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 514 S.W.2d 690 (Ky.
1974) (statute providing patients with right to humane care and treatment not penal in nature;
dismissal of criminal indictment affirmed); cf In re McMullins, 315 Pa. Super. 531, 538-43,
462 A.2d 718, 722-23 (1983).
473. 457 U.S. at 319.

1312

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIE W

[Vol. 20:1249

whether professional judgment has been exercised.4 7 4 A professional's
decision in such cases is "presumptively valid,"47 5 and "liability may be

imposed only when the decision... is such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment."4 76

While the question has been raised concerning the continued constitutional vitality of Wyatt after Youngberg,477 commentators apparently
have not extensively considered Youngberg's impact on the construction
of state statutory rights.478 A review of several pertinent cases reveals
that most 479 courts have continued to read relevant state statutes broadly
even in the aftermath of Youngberg.4 s°
474. Id. at 321.
475. Id. at 323. "Professional" is defined at id. n.30.

476. Id. at 323.
477. See, eg., Williams v. Walls, 734 F.2d 1434, 1437 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Alabama
attempts to meet the guidelines of Wyatt... in treating and releasing insanity acquittees.").
See generally Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 104 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 936 (1984)
("It is unclear to what extent [the Wyatt approach] retains vitality in light of... Youngberg.").
For other recent constitutional cases decided by federal courts construing Youngberg and
subsequent cases, see, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
459 (1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 374-76 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1992 (1986) and 107 S. Ct. 235'(1986); Armstead v. Pingree, 629 F. Supp. 273, 276 (M.D. Fla.
1986); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 376-80 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Doe by Roe v. Gaughan, 617
F. Supp. 1477, 1486-87 (D. Mass. 1985).
478. But see Note, ProtectingLiberty Interests: Developments in Vermont's Mental Health
Law as FederalConstitutionalProtection Declines, 9 VT. L. REv. 265 (1984).
479. But see Dixon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thompson, 91 Ill. 2d 518, 440 N.E.2d
117 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 505-15 for a discussion of this case.
480. See cases discussed supra text accompanying note 479 and infra text accompanying
notes 478-504; see also Marshall v. Kort, 690 P.2d 219, 221 (Colo. 1984) (habeas corpus petitioner, committed following finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, entitled to determination of legality of confinement, at which he can raise question of "remedy that addresses
appropriate treatment short of immediate release"); cf In re D.J.M., 158 N.J. Super. 497, 50002, 386 A.2d 870, 871-73 (1978) (although there is "no dispute" as to existence of statutory
right to treatment, question of quality of medical care generally not cognizable at "routine
review" of civil commitment; if patient wishes to raise treatment questions, counsel must give
prior notice to court and opposing counsel, and, if funding is involved, to the appropriate
public official charged with overseeing such funding); Bezio v. New York State Office of
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 95 A.D.2d 135, 466 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App.
Div. 1983) (statute directing state-created patient advocacy service to review suitability of
mentally retarded residents remaining in voluntary institutional status does not provide opportunity for resident to challenge appropriateness of treatment; such challenge must be raised in
collateral civil proceeding); Ford v. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 94 A.D.2d 262, 265, 464
N.Y.S.2d 481, 483 (App. Div. 1983) (in investigation of allegations that employee of state
hospital sexually abused patient, the State's duty extends beyond basic rights secured by the
United States Constitution).
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Thus, where a district court4 8 had ordered 482 the preparation of a
program by which the institutional population of a state school for the
developmentally disabled would be reduced by 200 residents, 48 3 state officials sought to have the injunction vacated on the grounds that

Youngberg was limited by its own terms to the involuntarily committed.4 84 These officials argued that since a significant number of the resi-

dents in the case before the court were voluntary admittees, they "[did]
not enjoy similar constitutional protection[s]." 48 5
The Eighth Circuit, in Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson,
rejected this argument on the basis of North Dakota state law which
"grants a right to treatment to all developmentally disabled persons." 4 86

The Olson court concluded that "because state law accords a panoply of
rights to handicapped individuals and makes no distinction between the

voluntarily and involuntarily committed, the State's contention that it
has no duty to provide appropriate treatment, services and habilitation to
involuntarily committed individuals in the least restrictive setting is with481. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in
part, modified and remanded on other grounds, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
482. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1983). The
district court also ordered state defendants (1) to either place eligible plaintiffs in licensed or
accredited aftercare facilities or to create community-based residential services meeting certain
professional standards so that the population at a state school for the mentally retarded would
be reduced to 450 over a five year period, and (2) to comply with all regulations promulgated
pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act at all facilities in which deinstitutionalized
plaintiffs reside or will reside in the future. Id. at 1388-89.
483. Id. at 1391-92.
484. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
485. Olson, 713 F.2d at 1392.
Defendants also cited Youngberg in support of their position that "state legislatures are
better suited to make difficult value judgments and resolve delicate issues of social problems
than [are] federal courts." Id. at 1391. The court of appeals rejected this argument and found
that the planned population reduction was "reasonable" and supported by professional testimony in the record, which revealed that only 10 to 200 developmentally disabled persons in
North Dakota required institutionalization, a position with which state officials did not "differ
significantly." Id. at 1392.
Also, the ordering of the development of a program could "hardly be classified as an
unreasonable intrusion into professional judgment." Id. The court of appeals noted further
that the district court had retained jurisdiction, and that, if the implementation of the program
proved to be impossible, that court could make any subsequent necessary changes that "justice
may require." Id. (citing Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Assoc. v. United States, 362
U.S. 458, 473 (1960)).
486. Olson, 713 F.2d 1393 (emphasis in original); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-02
(Supp. 1981) ("All persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for those disabilities ...[which] shall be provided in the least
restrictive [alternative]."); see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-01.2-01(1), -01(3), -03 to -13. Cf
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1984).
Societyfor Good Will is construed in Armstead, 629 F. Supp. at 276, and Kolpak, 619 F. Supp.
at 378.
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487

Elsewhere, in a case arising from an involuntary civil commitment
appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court ordered a remand so that the trial
court could consider plaintiff's argument that he was not receiving adequate and appropriate treatment.48 8 It squarely rejected the state's argument that the Youngberg standards control:
The issue, however, is not whether the constitutional minimum
has been met, but whether the statutory mandate of "treatment
which is adequate and appropriate to [the person's] condition"
has been met. This mandate may require something more than
the "reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by
these interests" which the Fourteenth Amendment requires.4 8 9
In Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission,490 a
case focusing on the state's right to demand reimbursement from a patient's estate for that individual's care and maintenance at a state hospital, the Mississippi Supreme Court looked carefully at the recent
487. Olson, 713 F.2d at 1393. But see PennhurstII, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment prohibits federal courts from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state
law); ef Clark, 794 F.2d at 83-84 (rejecting defendants' eleventh amendment contentions).
488. In re R.A., 146 Vt. 289, 501 A.2d 743, 744 (1985). Plaintiff, who suffered from Huntington's Chorea, a hereditary and degenerative neurological disease, had argued that he was
"developmentally disabled" under the definition employed in federal law and was thus eligible
for treatment in certain group home placements "adequate and appropriate to [his] condition"
under state law. 501 A.2d at 743-44; see 42 U.S.C. § 6001 (7) (West Supp. 1986); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 7617(e) (1985); cf In re Richard M., 127 N.H. 12, 497 A.2d 1200, 1204-06
(1985) (defining "developmentally disabled" under New Hampshire state law); see also N.H.
RFv. STAT. ANN. § 171-A:2 (Supp. 1983).
489. R.A., 501 A.2d at 744 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)); see also
In re W.H., 144 Vt. 595, 481 A.2d 22 (1984) (consideration of less restrictive alternatives
required prior to involuntary hospitalization); In re A.C., 144 Vt. 37, 470 A.2d 1191 (1984)
(setting limits on ability of trial court to alter medication regime of institutionalized mentally
disabled person). In analyzing these other post-Youngberg cases, a commentator has
concluded:
Although [Youngberg] may be interpreted to support a constitutional right of freedom from involuntary confinement, its deferential standard of review could preclude
active judicial enforcement of this right. [Youngberg] will undermine the activist role
of the federal judiciary in mental health cases.
State statutory rights, often enacted to comply with what were considered constitutional requirements at the time, now offer a more promising basis for protection
of the liberty interests of mental patients ....
Note, supra note 478, at 286; cf In re V.C., 146 Vt. 454, 505 A.2d 1214, 1216-17 (1985) (while
patient has enforceable state statutory right to adequate treatment, statute does not contemplate ordering state Commissioner of Mental Health to place patient in out-of-state facility);
see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 7617(b)(3), 7703(b) (Supp. 1986); see also In re M.G., 137 Vt.
521, 408 A.2d 653 (1979) (pre-Youngberg case).
490. 429 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1983).
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"explosion of litigation" 9 1 regarding the substantive and procedural
rights of the mentally disabled. The court noted that such rights "find
their content" in two sources: (1) the "federal constitutional minimum,"
and (2) "higher or broader state created rights. 4 9 2 The court concluded
that Mississippi's civil commitment law has "without doubt ... vested
rights in the mentally ill substantially in excess of those minimum protections required by the federal constitution."4'9 3
Foy v. Greenblott49 4 presented a unique damages action. An incompetent patient and her infant son sued the facility in which she was institutionalized and her institutional doctors on a "wrongful birth" theory.
The plaintiff argued that her son's birth was due to defendants' negligence in failing to supervise her and/or to provide her with appropriate
birth control devices or counseling in light of their awareness of her medical history of "irresponsible sexual behavior toward [others]." 49 5 As
part of her position, she asserted that "under no circumstances should a
woman adjudicated as incompetent be permitted to bear a child." 49' 6
In rejecting this aspect of her claim, 4 97 the court noted that, under
state statute, institutionalized mental patients enjoy " 'the same legal
rights and responsibilities guaranteed all other persons' except those specifically denied her by law,"4 98 including the "fundamental" right to
"freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion and to choose
whether to bear children."4 9 9 In response to plaintiff's suggestion that
she be subject to "extra supervision" so as to insure that she does not
conceive," the court relied on the state patients' bill of rights as entitling
every institutionalized person to "individualized treatment under the
'least restrictive' conditions feasible," so that "the institution should minimize interference with a patient's individual autonomy, including her
491. Id. at 582.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
495. Id. at 5, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
496. Id. at 9, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
497. The court of appeal allowed plaintiff to proceed only under the theory that defendants'
failure to make contraceptive counseling and medication available to her was "possibly actionable." Id. at 13, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 92. Associate Justice Poche, in his concurring opinion,
characterized plaintiffs' complaint as "an unfortunate, classic example of mushball pleading"
and a "creature of obfuscation." Id. at 16, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
498. Id. at 9, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325.1, 5325,
5327 (West 1984)). The court stated that "[t]he courts and legislatures do not subscribe to
[plaintiffs'] theory of eugenics." Id.
499. Id. (quoting Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 632, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516,
520 (1982)).
500. Id. at 10, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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personal 'privacy' and 'social interaction.' ,,501 Effective hospital policing of all patients "would not only deprive them of the freedom to engage
in consensual sexual relations, which they would enjoy outside the institution, but would also compromise the privacy and dignity of all
02
5

residents.
In a footnote, the court noted that numerous other courts had found

a federal constitutional right to the least restrictive conditions of institutional treatment,50 3 but claimed that the Supreme Court had declined to
rule on the question, citing Youngberg v. Romeo." ° The Foy court appeared to interpret, 505 however, the "reasonably non-restrictive confinement conditions" constitutionally mandated by Youngberg50 6 to include

"suitable opportunities for the patient's interaction with members of the
opposite sex" as among
the "minimum constitutional standards for ade'50 7
quate treatment.
On the other hand, in a suit brought to enjoin the implementation of

a plan to close a state residential facility for the mentally retarded, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in Dixon Association for Retarded Citizens v.

Thompson, 50° disposed of the issue by simply finding that "the statutory
rights granted [to institutionalized developmentally disabled persons]
under the [state] Code50 9 are more expansive than and include the consti-

tutional rights of the [facility] residents,

' 510

citing Youngberg."' After

reading in pari materia three statutory sections of the state bill of rights
501. Id. (quoting, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325.1(a), (b), (g), 5358(a), (c) (West
1984)).
502. Id. at 10, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
503. Id at 10 n.2, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91 n.2 (citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub. nom Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)).
504. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)).
505. The footnote in which this issue is discussed is ambiguous. It notes that the Supreme
Court has not ruled on the right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative, that it has
mandated "reasonably non-restrictive confinement conditions" (citing Youngberg), and that
"one such least restrictive treatment case" provides, as a minimum constitutional standard for
treatment, opportunities for social interactions with the opposite sex. Id.
506. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; see also In re Thompson, 394 Mass. 502, 476 N.E.2d
216, 219 (1985) (construing the "reasonably non-restrictive confinement conditions" language
of Youngberg).
507. Foy, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 10 n.2, 190 Cal Rptr. at 91 n.2 (citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373, 379-81 (1972)).
508. 91 Il.2d 518, 522, 440 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1982).
509. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 2-100 (1985 Supp.) ("No recipient of services shall
be deprived of any rights, benefits or privileges guaranteed by law, the Constitution of the State
of Illinois, or the Constitution of the United States solely on account of the receipt of such
services.").
510. Dixon, 91 Ill.
2d at 523, 440 N.E.2d at 119 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982)).
511. Id.
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for institutionalized persons, 12 the court concluded that, under the code,
"adequate and humane care and service would seem to include the care
or service encompassed within the definition of 'habilitation.' "5113 For
such care or services to be "adequate," they would also have to conform
to another Code provision that no service recipient may be denied any
rights guaranteed by the state or federal constitution.' 14 The court then
turned to Youngberg and determined that the rights declared there by the
Supreme Court "essentially overlap the rights conferred by [state
law]. 5 15 On the merits of the case, the court found that, before the facility in question had been ordered to be closed, there was "detailed, considered planning, ' and that the relocation program in question was
designed by professionals who "had exercised their professional
judgment.

517

Although certain other professionals disagreed with the decisions
made, the court declined to interfere because the program ultimately
designed was not "'such a substantial departure from accepted profes-

sional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person[s] responsible actually did not base the decision' on their professional

judgment.

5

18

Thus, with the exception of Dixon, the Illinois case, most

state courts have been willing to interpret state patients' rights laws expansively in light of (or, perhaps, in spite of) the Supreme Court's cau-

tionary language as to professional deference and institutional
decisionmaking in Youngberg.
512. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 7 2-102(a) (1985); id. ch. 91 1/2, %%
1-111, 1-115
(1981). These statutes are discussed in Dixon, 91 Ill.
2d at 529, 440 N.E.2d at 122-23.
513. Dixon, 91 Ill.
2d at 529, 440 N.E.2d at 123. "Habilitation" is defined in the statute as
including, but not being limited to "diagnosis, evaluation, medical services, residential care,
day care, special living arrangements, training, education, sheltered employment, protective
services, counseling and other services provided to developmentally disabled persons by developmental disabilities facilities." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, q 1-111.
514. Dixon, 91 Ill.
2d at 529-30, 440 N.E.2d at 123 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 7 2100).
515. Id. at 530, 440 N.E.2d at 123 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, %2-102(a) (1981)).
Under that section: "A recipient of services shall be provided with adequate and humane careand services in the least restrictive environment, pursuant to an individual services plan, which
shall be formulated and periodically reviewed with the participation of the recipient to the
extent feasible .. " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, %2-102(a).
516. Dixon, 91111. 2d at 534, 440 N.E.2d at 125.
517. Id. at 535, 440 N.E.2d at 125.
518. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)); cf. Thomas S.v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1992 and 107 S.Ct. 235 (1986); see also
Savastano v. Prevost, 66 N.Y.2d 47, 485 N.E.2d 213, 495 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1985) (mandamus does
not lie under state law to create mandatory duty on part of state commissioner of mental
health to transfer certain mentally retarded patients to state facility for the retarded; right to
treatment issue not reached).
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The right to refuse treatment
a. introduction

As of 1978, one of the most influential law review articles on the
right to refuse treatment 19 characterized then-existing state regulatory
legislation as "a patchwork of inconsistencies and omissions that offers
committed persons little real protection from coerced treatment. 5 20 At
least thirteen states at that time, including the District of Columbia, had
no requirement of any sort mandating informed consent prior to the im-

position of psychiatric treatment.52 ' Several of the states that regulated
the subject matter limited the scope of statutory protections to interven'
tions that were not "standard psychiatric treatment"522
or to "intru5
'
23
52
4
'
525
sive,"
"hazardous,"
or "unnecessary
treatment. In most cases,

substituted consent of a close relative could be sought to override a patient's desire to refuse,5 26 and the statutory provisions offered "few con5 27
crete protections for the involuntarily committed mental patient.)
On the specific issue of drug treatment, several states did provide
that patients could not be administered "unnecessary or excessive) 5 28 or
"experimental ' 5 29 medication, and, in at least three jurisdictions, voluntary patients had an absolute right to refuse medication. 30 In other
519. Plotkin, supra note 234. Plotkin's article has been cited in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291, 297 n.9 (1982); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard,
506 F. Supp. 915, 927 n.10 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136
(D.N.J. 1978), laterproceeding,476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified andremanded, 653
F.2d 836, 853 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated andremanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand,720
F.2d 266, 276 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983). Plotkin's methodology is criticized, however, in Gutheil &
Appelbaum, 'Mind Control," "SyntheticSanity," "'ArtificialCompetence, " and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects ofAntipsychotic Medication, 12 HoFsTRA L. REV.77, 88 n.57
(1983-84).
520. Plotkin, supra note 234, at 498.
521. Id. at 498 n.229. See generally id. at 504 app.
522. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 88-502.4(c) (1986).
523. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.191(1)(g) (Baldwin 1985).
524. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(6) (1983).
525. Wis. STAT. § 51.61(l)(h) (1985).
526. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.130(b) (repealed 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-206d(6) (West Supp. 1986).
527. Plotkin, supra note 234, at 499.
528. MONT.CODE ANN. § 53-21-145 (1985).
529. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(6).
530. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:15 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:424.2d(l) (West 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7206 (Purdon Supp. 1986). A New Jersey
state trial court interpreted that state's statute to imply that involuntarily committed patients
did not have the right to refuse treatment. See In re Hospitalization of B., 156 N.J. Super. 231,
383 A.2d 760 (Law Div. 1977), a holding which led, in significant part to the litigation in
Rennie. See supra note 14 for the history of this litigation.
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states, however, statutes specifically empowered institutions to administer "adequate medical and psychiatric care and treatment" 5 3 1 and stipulated that all treatment is the "sole responsibility" of the treating
doctor. 532 In short, prior to the major constitutional litigation in Rennie
v. Klein133 and Rogers v. Okin5 34 sketching the constitutional contours of
the involuntarily committed patient's right to refuse medication, 35 few
jurisdictions provided meaningful protections through state-level patients' bills of rights.
b.

litigationprior to Rennie and Rogers

Several pre-1982 cases relied on state patients' bills of rights to find
that involuntarily committed mentally disabled persons had a right to
refuse treatment.5 36 The Colorado Supreme Court537 interpreted that
state's statutes 53 8 and common law5 39 to conclude that an involuntary
patient had a right to withhold consent to the administration of an antipsychotic drug5" in "non-emergency circumstances." '4 1
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court read then-recent amend531. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (1958) (recodified as TEx. R.v. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5547-82 (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
532. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.070(6) (1985).
533. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979)
(supplemental opinion), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
534. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738
F.2d I (1st Cir. 1984).
535. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 72.
536. But see In re Hospitalization of B., 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760 (1977), discussed supra at note 530.
537. Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979).
538. The Colorado Supreme Court read the "entire tenor of the... [mental health statutes]
to recognize and protect the dignity and legal rights of patients treated pursuant to its provisions." Id. at 410, 603 P.2d at 125 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10101(1) (Supp. 1986) (purpose of law); id., § 27-10-104 (1986) (no forfeiture of rights by reason
of being treated); id. § 27-10-116 (Supp. 1986) (right to treatment). See generally Goedecke,
198 Colo. at 410 n.6, 603 P.2d at 125 n.6.
539. The court cited with approval Justice Cardozo's famous language from Schloendorff
that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body." Goedecke, 198 Colo. at 411, 603 P.2d at 125 (quoting Schloendorff
v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)). The Court also cited Colorado
state cases that acknowledged "the physician's obligation to obtain the patient's informed consent not only for surgery, but also for treatment with drugs having possible harmful side effects." Id. at 411 nn.7-8, 603 P.2d at 125 nn.7-8.
540. In this case, the antipsychotic drug is prolixin decanoate. Id. at 409, 603 P.2d at 123.
541. Id. at 411, 603 P.2d at 125; see also In re Freeman, 636 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (enforcing the holding of Goedecke).
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merits to that state's mental health code542 as a "credible reform to end,
in some areas, the blanket denial of personal rights to patients in mental
institutions."5'4 3 It adopted the reasoning and holdings of the trial courts
in Rennie and Rogers to hold that legally competent adults involuntarily
admitted to state mental hospitals had the right to consent to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. 54
c.

litigationsince Rennie and Rogers

The Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Rogers 45 and the Third
Circuit's decision in Rennie v. Klein54 6 following the Supreme Court's
remand547 are not without their ambiguities548 and the law remains in a
state of flux. 5 49 Subsequent developments have not justified many of the
Cassandra-esque interpretations which immediately followed in the wake
of the decisions.550 Four years later, "in most jurisdictions, [the right to
5' 51
refuse is] alive and well.
542. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 54.1, 64 (West 1979).
543. In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980). For an evaluation of the predecessor
law, see generally Ginsberg, Civil Rights of the Mentally Disabled in Oklahoma, 20 OKLA. L.
REv. 117, 127-30, 134 (1967).
544. K.K.B., 609 P.2d at 749-52. The court specifically noted that "[ihere is no support in
common law for the proposition that treatment, medical or psychiatric, constitutes a legally
nonreversible medical decision." Id. at 751.
545. 457 U.S. 291.
546. 720 F.2d 266.
547. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
548. See Perlin, supra note 72.
549. See Perlin, supra note 74, at 8.
550. See, e.g., Note, supra note 235, at 1727 ("substantive remedy ... effectively extinguished in 1982 by the Supreme Court"); Kemna, supra note 234, at 122 (Supreme Court
"virtually extinguish[ed] ...[the] right"); cf Note, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication:
A Proposalfor Legislative Consideration, 17 IND. L. Rv. 1035, 1051 (1984) ("remand leaves
uncertain both the scope of the federal right to refuse antipsychotic medication and the standards to be used by state mental institutions in order to protect this right").
551. Perlin, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Quo Vadis?, Directions in Psychiatry
(Hatherleigh Co.) vol. 6, lesson 14 (1986).
For a full analysis of the impact of state law upon the ultimate decision in Rogers, see
Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). This aspect of Rogers is
considered carefully in Note, Medical Law-The Right to Refuse Antlosychotic Drug Treatment: Substantive Rights and Procedural Guidelines in Massachusetts, 7 W. NEw ENG. L.
REV. 125 (1984).

For a recent state statute specifically elaborating on the right to refuse medication (and
generally following the procedures approved in Rennie), see MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 10-708 (Supp. 1985). For a statute mandating the provision to patients of certain substantive
information about medications, see ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.825(c) (1985) ("A patient has the
right to know the name of medication that the patient is asked to take, what its purpose is, and
what side effects may occur with this medication"). But see id. § 47.30.825(e) ("Psychotropic
medication shall be administered only on the order of a licensed physician when the physician
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Thus, in Arizona 552 and Colorado,55 3 state appellate courts have underscored that state law required more extensive procedural and substantive protections than did the federal Constitution.5 54 The Arizona Court

of Appeals followed state statutory law555 in ordering defendants to promulgate appropriate regulations governing the use of psychotropic drugs
as restraints and written agency procedures as to the use of such
drugs.5 5 6 The Colorado Supreme Court construed state law5 57 to mandate strict protections, including, in most circumstances,5 58 a pre-administration adversary hearing, 55 9 and adherence to the principle of the least
5 60
restrictive alternative in decisions to drug.
Other state statutory cases have considered the extent of procedural
due process protections available in cases dealing with other treatments
determines that this medication is in the best interest of the patient or will prevent serious
harm to others").
A model state statute is suggested in Note, supra note 550, at 1053-63. See also Note,
Pathway Through the PsychotropicJungle: The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs in Illinois,
18 MARSHALL L. Ruv. 407 (1985) (analyzing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 1 2-107 (Supp.
1985)).
552. Anderson v. State, 135 Ariz. 578, 663 P.2d 570 (1982).
553. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985).
554. See, eg., Anderson, 135 Ariz. at 583, 663 P.2d at 575 ("Arizona law requires considerably more than the minimal requirements of the federal constitution").
555. See, e.g., ARiz. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 36-513 (1986). For an early and comprehensive
analysis of the Arizona patients' rights law, see White, ProtectionFollowing Commitment: Enforcing the Rights of Persons Confined in Arizona Mental Health Facilities, 17 ARIZ. L. REv.
1090 (1975).
556. Anderson, 135 Ariz. at 585-87, 663 P.2d at 577-79; cf Large v. Superior Court, 148
Ariz. 229, 236, 714 P.2d 399, 406 (1986) (forcible administration of psychotropic drugs to treat
mentally ill convict in nonemergency situation violated state constitution). The Large court
noted that state patients' bill of rights applied only to civilly committed patients. Id. at 239,
714 P.2d at 409; see also Large, 148 Ariz. at 240-41, 714 P.2d at 410-11 (Cameron, J., dissenting) ("majority does not go far enough in protecting [plaintiff's] right of privacy"; dissent
would allow absolute right to refuse). See generally infra text accompanying notes 572-85
(discussing Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1986)).
557. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-101 to -129 (Supp. 1986).
558. The court excluded cases where there was an emergency which posed an "immediate
and substantial threat to the life or safety of the patient or others in the institution ...
Medina, 705 P.2d at 963.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 974. Adherence to the constitutional principle of the least restrictive alternative
had been abandoned in the Rennie remand opinion in light of the Supreme Court's direction
for the third circuit to reconsider its prior decision in light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307 (1982). See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 69.
For other recent cases construing state statutes dealing with drugging issues, see, e.g.,
Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Kolocotronis v. Ritterbusch, 667
S.W.2d 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Savastano v. Saribeyoglu, 126 Misc. 2d 52,480 N.Y.S.2d 977
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); In re L.R., 146 Vt. 17, 497 A.2d 753 (1985).

1322

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:1249

such as electroshock therapy.5 6 1 Thus, after the Kentucky Court of Appeals construed a state scheme 562 to bar the compulsory imposition of

such treatment in the absence of a finding of an emergency or a judicial
declaration of incompetence,

cision," 564

63

the state legislature "codified the... de-

by requiring due process hearings at which the court must

consider the patient's competence to consent to the treatment and the
threat which would be posed by the patient if he were not to be so
5 65
treated.
In California, an intermediate appellate court read state electroshock law 566 together with the state's evidence code5 67 to mandate a
finding that clear and convincing evidence was required to support an

order that an incompetent community resident lacked the capacity to
consent to or to refise electroshock therapy. 61 The court relied on prior
case law, 569 the extensive procedural safeguards built into the relevant
state statutory sections, 57 0 and a state attorney general's opinion which
had found that the incompetent person's right to refuse medical treat561. See generally Plotkin, supra note 234, at 471-72; Note, Regulation of Electroconvulsive
Therapy, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 363 (1976); Comment, Informed Consent and the MentalPatient:
CaliforniaRecognizes a Mental Patient'sRight to Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock Treatment,
15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 725 (1975); see, e.g., Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456 (7th Cir.
1983).
562. Under the then-existing statute, the state's Secretary of the Department of Human
Resources was empowered to adopt rules and regulations enforcing certain patients' rights,
including the right to "refuse intrusive treatments, such as electroshock therapy .... ." Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.180(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1977). Pursuant to this statute, a
regulation was adopted providing for the provision of electroshock therapy to a patient if a
court determined that such treatment was "in the best interest of the patient." 902 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 12:020, § 8 (1981); see Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
563. Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d at 731. The court cited the district court's initial opinion in Rennie, 462 F. Supp. 1131, and the First Circuit's initial opinion in Rogers, 634 F.2d
650, in support of the proposition that a person generally "has a constitutionally protected
right to decide for himself whether to submit to serious and potentially harmful medical treatment." Gundy, 619 S.W.2d at 731.
564. Oberst & Hunt, Administrative and ConstitutionalLaw, 71 KY. L.J. 417, 436 (198283).
565. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.196(3) (Miechie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); see also In re
W.S., 152 N.L Super. 298, 301-03, 377 A.2d 969, 971 Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) (construing
N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-24.2d (2) (West 1981), and holding that "[m]entally ill patients have the
right to be informed of and participate in the decision-making aspects of their treatment").
566. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325(f), 5325.1, 5326.2, 5326.5, 5326.7 (1984); see
also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976) (pre-Rennie and preRogers analysis of similar aspects of the predecessor law); see generally, Hoffman, The "Due
Process" Rights of Minors in Mental Hospitals, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 63, 63 n.3 (1978).
567. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 115, 160 (West 1965).
568. Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 324-25, 206 Cal. Rptr. 603, 609
(1984).
569. Id. at 321, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 606-07.
570. Id. at 318-22, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 604-07.
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ment "'involves such fundamental rights as ... the right to the inviola-

bility of one's person.'

"571

Most recently, in Keyhea v. Rushen,5 72 a California intermediate appellate court construed a state statute 73 to provide mentally disabled
prisoners with the right to a judicial determination of their competency
to refuse treatment before they can be subjected to long-term involuntary
psychotropic medication.57 4 In the course of its decision, the Keyhea
court tracked the use of psychotropic drugs in cases involving institu-

tional populations,5 75 noting that such medications serve as "a primary
tool of public mental health professionals for treating serious mental disorders. 51 76 The court also found that these drugs "have many serious
side effects," '5 77 and "'possess a remarkable potential for undermining
individual will and self-direction, thereby producing a psychological state
of unusual receptiveness to the directions of custodians.' 578
The Keyhea court construed state law-which it characterized as a
"prison 'bill of rights' " 5 7 9-to effectuate an absolute grant of civil rights
to prisoners (excepting where deprivation is necessary for security or

safety reasons) "without cost/benefit considerations, presumably because
of the importance of civil rights in a free society." 580 It also read the

provision of state law governing the involuntary medication of nonprisoners under conservatorship 581 to mandate a prior judicial determi-

nation as to incompetency before the sanctioning of "involuntary longterm psychotropic medication."582
571. Id. at 322, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (quoting 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 849-50 (1975)); see
also In re Fadley, 159 Cal. App. 3d 440, 446-47, 205 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575-76 (1984) (least
restrictive alternative inquiry not necessary in electroshock determination; trial court's examination of issue harmless error). Lillian F. and Fadley were decided by different panels of the
court of appeal sitting in different districts.
572. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1975) (prisoners may be deprived of only such
rights "as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which
he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public."); see generally De Lancie v.
Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982) (discussing legislative
history).
573. 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1986).
574. Id. at 527, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 531, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
577. Id. at 531, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
578. Id. (quoting Gelman, Mental HospitalDrugs,Professionalismand the Constitution, 72
GEO. L.J. 1725, 1751 (1984)).
579. Id. at 534, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 750 (quoting In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 698, 470 P.2d
640, 655, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 522 (1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971)).
580. Keyhea, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 534, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
581. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1987); id. § 5358.2 (West 1984).
582. Keyhea, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 536, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
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On the question of whether there was a general constitutional or
common-law right on the part of nonprisoners to refuse the administration of such medication, the Keyhea court noted the "conflict" in other
jurisdictions, 8 3 but declined to resolve the question because the right was
provided under state statute.51 4 After finding that nonprisoners thus had
a right to a prior competency hearing, the court found that there would
be no threat to prison security if such a right were extended to prisoners
5
as well. 11
d. conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision to "sidestep" ' 6 the constitutional issue of the right to refuse treatment in Mills has had little apparent impact
on state courts interpreting state statutes in analogous cases. In fact, it
may have strengthened the resolve of state court judges to articulate the
right in question clearly and broadly. For instance, the California court
concluded Keyhea, the prison case, with this ringing declaration:
We conclude that state prisoners, like nonprisoners under
the [state] statutory scheme, are entitled to a judicial determination of their competency to refuse treatment before they can
be subjected to long-term involuntary psychotropic medication.
Mental health professionals and prison administrators may find
this requirement cumbersome, but this is a price of life in a free
society. Forced drugging is one of the earmarks of the gulag.
It should be permitted in state institutions only after adherence
to stringent substantive and procedural safeguards."8 7

3. Other institutional rights and rights in the community
a.

"other" institutionalrights

There has not been a significant amount of litigation construing
state statutory sections providing patients with "other"58' substantive in583. Id at 540, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 754 (citing Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 266 (3d Cir.
1983); Goedecke v. State Dep't of Trust, 198 Colo. 407, 410-411, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (1979); In
re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1980)).
584. Keyhea, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55.
585. Id. at 542, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
586. See supra note 96.
587. Keyhea, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56. This position, it should be
made clear, is not a unanimous one in prison cases. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Martin, 589 F. Supp.
680, 682-83 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (administration of psychotropic medication did not violate
prisoners' federal constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment).
588. See generally Perlin, supra note 368.
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stitutional rights."8 9 In earlier cases involving the inspection of hospital
records, courts had interpreted such laws to entitle former patients to

inspect their records upon a showing of materiality or relevancy to subsequent litigation,5 90 but to bar such inspection by a patient's friend where
such examination would not be in the patient's "best interest. ' 59 1 In a
more recent action, a federal district court denied an application for summary judgment and ordered a trial on the merits to determine whether
seemingly conflicting provisions of Colorado's patients' bill of rights controlling release of medical records 592 violated plaintiff's constitutional

rights to a fair commitment hearing.593 In other matters, courts have
held that visitation by a friend could be denied where such a visit would

not be in the patient's "best interests."

94

In another case, despite the

entry of an omnibus federal consent order in an institutional conditions
suit,595 a resident at the institution in question was found to have the
right to file a civil action pursuant to the state patients' bill of rights
challenging a staff decision which precluded
her from receiving mail ad596
aliases.
certain
under
her
to
dressed

b. rights in the community
Statutory community rights cases have established a right to deinstitutionalization and aftercare,

97

to be free from discrimination in housing

589. For commentaries on some of the relevant statutes, see, e.g., Dix, The 1983 Revision of
the Texas MentalHealth Code, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 41, 112-16 (1984); Janus & Wolfson, The
Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982: Summary andAnalysis, 6 HAMLINE L. REv. 41, 52-59
(1983); White, supra note 555, at 1093-95, 1106-14; Comment, Pennsylvania's Commitment:
The MentalHealth ProceduresAct, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 1035, 1037-47 (1977); Comment, The Louisiana Mental Health Law of 1977- An Analysis and a Critique, 52 TUL. L. REv. 542, 555-56
(1978).
590. Morris v. Hoerster, 348 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (construing TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-87(a)(1) (Vernon 1958)).
591. Myrick v. Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp., 334 Mass. 42, 45, 133 N.E.2d 487,
489 (1956).
592. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801 (Supp. 1986) (restricting release of medical records
which, in the opinion of a qualified mental health professional, would have a "significant negative psychological impact" on the patient); id. § 27-10-116(l)(a) (providing for the general
availability of treatment records).
593. Brown v. Jensen, 572 F. Supp. 193, 199-200 (D. Colo. 1983). See generally Gotkin v.
Miller, 514 F.2d 125, 129 n.6 (2d Cir. 1975) (in granting hospitalized patients some degree of
property interest in their records, state is not constitutionally required to grant patients all
"traditional incidences" of property rights, including the right to inspect and copy such
records).
594. Myrick, 334 Mass. at 42, 133 N.E.2d at 489.
595. See Goodwin v. Shapiro, 545 F. Supp. 826 (D.N.J. 1982).
596. Smith v. Shapiro, 197 N.J. Super. 320, 328-29, 484 A.2d 1282, 1286-87 (App. Div.
1984), cerL denied, 101 N.J. 235, 501 A.2d 912 (1985).
597. See, e.g., Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
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and zoning decisions,59 8 and to procedural due process prior to deciding
whether to undergo sterilization. 99 In one recent case, the New York
Court of Appeals ordered a trial on behalf of deinstitutionalized, homeless persons and hospitalized patients who met statutory discharge criteria but for whom no adequate aftercare placement was available." °
Subsequently, the trial court partially denied defendant's dismissal mo-

tion on the grounds that a state statute provided plaintiffs with the right
to a written "service plan" including "a specific recommendation of the

type of residence in which the patient is to live."60 1
F

Conclusion

Thus, although developments involving state patients' bills of rights
have received neither the attention nor the fanfare of constitutional developments in parallel substantive areas, recent decisions reflect a willingness on the part of most of the state courts that have faced these

questions to interpret statutory rights broadly and expansively even in an
environment where the Supreme Court has made it clear that such scope
of decision is not required under the federal Constitution. However, be-

cause relatively little attention has been paid to this body of case law, its
impact has not yet been particularly significant or far-reaching.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Just as our view of former golden ages-in the arts and recreationmay have been distorted a bit by our youth and by the relative novelty of
the subject matter in question (at least its newness to us), so too perhaps
have we unnecessarily deified the golden age of federal litigation on behalf of the mentally disabled. While there is no question that the early
cases-Jackson v. Indiana; Wyatt v. Stickney; O'Connor v. Donaldson;

the trial court decisions in Rennie v. Klein, Mills v. Rogers, and Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman-articulateda vision of
598. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n, 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448
(1984); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. The Residential Sys., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673
(1978); State ex rel Thelen v. City of Missoula, 168 Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975).
599. For discussions of the pertinent procedural and substantive issues, see Wentzel v.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1147 (1983); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,
426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 304 S.E.2d 793 (1983), modified, 313
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In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
600. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
601. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 126 Misc. 2d 247, 252, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
(construing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(g)(2) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1986)).
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equal rights for the handicapped that has neither been duplicated nor
fulfilled in the intervening decade, examination of the first stages of litigation under state constitutions and state patients' rights statutes reveals
that many of the same rights may be vindicated in state courts.
Although state tribunals are not without their problems in cases involving institutional relief (especially when there are serious financial implications),6" 2 the meaning of Pennhurst II is stark for litigators
representing institutionalized populations seeking broad-based relief in
federal court.60 3 If the Supreme Court, as Justice Stevens has charged,
has forgotten "its primary role as the protector of the citizen and not the
warden or the prosecutor," 6" then it appears likely that litigation in the
next "golden age" will unfold on the battlefields of state courts. State
courts may truly be, for the mentally disabled seeking judicial relief, the
last frontier.

602. See generally Neuborne, supra note 33.
603. See supra text accompanying notes 31-49
604. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 387 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Colorado
v. Connelly, 106 S. Ct. 785, 787 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting to grant of certiorari and to the Court's "willingness to take special judicial action to assist the prosecutor"),
107 S. Ct. 515, 525 (1986) (dissenting on question of whether criminal defendant's mental
disability rendered his Miranda waiver ineffective).

